HaCKeRz Kr0nlcKLeZ 1/HaCKeRz Kr0nlcKLeZ.iso/drugs/western.hemisphere.strategy

Text File | 1996-05-06 | 175.9 KB | 3,719 lines

Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [e-mail] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part One
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:35 GMT

[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [e-mail] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:05:34 GMT ]

      Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation
                        Federal News Service
                      JUNE  22, 1994, WEDNESDAY

Section: Capitol Hill Hearing
Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security,
International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The
Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign
Affairs Committee
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere

Chaired By:
Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca)
Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj)

Witnesses:
Robert Gelbard,
 Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters,
Thomas Constantine,
 Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
Brian Sheridan,
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense

Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, Dc

REP. LANTOS: Before turning to our distinguished witnesses, let me
just make two observations.  I identify myself in very strong
measure with the comments of my distinguished colleague and
friend, Chairman Torricelli, but I would like to observe that some
of the comments from the Republican side would make it appear that
we have had a brilliant and successful anti-drug strategy for 12
years, and suddenly in the last 18 months we have fallen down on
the job, and the record will surely not support that.  The drug
problem in the United States did not begin on January 20th of
1993.  Our anti-drug strategy with respect to the hemisphere did
not begin -- whatever it is -- 16 months ago -- and just as the
problem of the whole drug complex is not a partisan problem, I
would hope that my colleagues will approach it in a somewhat less
partisan fashion that what we have seen in the last few minutes.

We will ask our distinguished witnesses to make concise opening
statements.

Your prepared presentations will be entered in the record in their
entirety.

We will first hear from the assistant secretary for international
narcotics matters, the Honorable Robert Gelbard.

Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.  We appreciate your concise
approach at the outset so we can get to questions.  There will be
plenty of questions.

MR. GELBARD: Thank you very much.  Chairman Lantos, Chairman
Torricelli, Congressman Smith, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today with Mr. Constantine and Mr. Sheridan.
Let me thank you from the outset for agreeing to reschedule this
hearing.  I understand the demands on the committee's time and the
problems caused by a last-minute postponement.  I hope that by the
end of today's hearing, we will all agree that we were better
served by waiting this past week.

As you requested, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my full
prepared statement for the record.

REP. LANTOS: Without objection.

MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to
talk today about perceptions.  I ask you to take a step back and
look at the world through the eyes of the narcotics trafficker.
Unfortunately, it doesn't look so bad, and some trends are moving
his way.  In some countries, including our own, the trafficker is
once again hearing the sweet -- to him -- and misleading sounds of
debate over legalization.

In Colombia, the prosecutor-general, Gustavo Degrave (ph) has
negotiated soft deals with leaders of the Cali Cartel, sometimes
bargaining away evidence that we have provided in the process.  In
Bolivia, evidence is now coming to light that the previous
government was deeply penetrated by traffickers.

Closer to home, last year the budget of every --

REP. LANTOS: May I stop you there?  You say deeply penetrated. How
high was it penetrated?

MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I was ambassador to Bolivia during the
time of much of that government.  Certainly members of the cabinet
-- some members of the cabinet were involved, and at my
insistence, the president of Bolivia fired the minister of the
interior, Guillermo Capobianco (ph), who was deeply involved in
accepting trafficker money, as was the head of the national
police, and we believe there are others.  This is currently an
issue under investigation by the Bolivian Congress, so I would
rather not enter into any specifics on this respecting their
prerogatives.

REP. LANTOS: Thank you.

MR. GELBARD: Last year the budget of every United States
government agency dedicated to international counternarcotics was
dramatically reduced.  My own bureau's budget dropped 30 percent,
with even deeper cuts to military and economic support funds
supporting our counternarcotics efforts.

We are reducing staff at several narcotics affairs sections
overseas..

This year's budget picture is no brighter.  Thanks in part to the
efforts of some members of this committee, the House appropriation
for international counternarcotics restores some of last year's
cuts.  The Senate bill, however, leaves us at last year's skeleton
level, well below the president's request.

Mr. Chairman, let me be blunt.  I cannot do the job that you
expect of me and the secretary of state asks of me if I do not
have adequate resources.  If we take another year of major funding
cuts, then something has to go.  Perhaps we will slash sustainable
development programs in the Andes and close other programs
altogether. We might be forced to reduce support for eradication
programs and generally cut back our aviation support.
Unquestionably, we would have difficulty funding new programs
whether targeted against the growing United States' heroin
epidemic or against organized crime in Russia and Eastern Europe.

I do not mean to put a gun against my own head and threaten to
pull the trigger if Congress does not vote us a larger budget, but
it is important to acknowledge in advance that these sorts of cuts
will have direct and explicit consequences.

The truth is that we do have a good story to tell about
international counternarcotics programs.  We are paying a price
today for some unfortunate rhetoric in the past. Efforts against
drugs are not a war that we will win in two, three or four years.
Success or failure is not tabulated on an accountant's data sheet
of arrests, seizures and current street price.  The struggle
against drugs is the work of a generation, not of a statistician.

Last year, we developed a new counternarcotics strategy for the
Western Hemisphere.  It addresses the twin concerns confronting
this administration and this Congress in January of 1993: the
perception that the past strategy was not working and the need to
reduce budgets. The new strategy calls for a gradual shift in
emphasis from transit interdiction to source country efforts.  It
calls for us to support stronger democratic counternarcotics
institutions in source countries and to integrate counternarcotics
into global alternative development strategy.  It seeks greater
involvement by international and multinational organizations and
continued efforts against entire trafficker organizations.

In short, the new strategy seeks to reinforce what we have seen
that works, coordinate and consolidate among multiple programs to
ensure efficiency, and engage international organizations that
previously had shied away from involvement in counternarcotics.
The president's new strategy called for us to use the narcotics
certification process energetically as an antidrug tool.  On April
1st, the president's certification decisions put substance behind
the words.  Ten of the 26 countries were denied certification or
granted it only on the basis of a vital national interest
certification.  This was an honest process.  These were not just
pariah nations with whom we have no serious bilateral interests.
Nigeria, Bolivia and Peru had never before received anything less
than full certification.  Panama and Laos did not receive full
certification, despite serious and important U.S. concerns outside
of narcotics issues.

The president's certification decision sent a very clear signal.

Business as usual is no longer good enough.  We will bear our
burden in the world-wide struggle against drugs, but we expect the
same commitment from our fellow governments.  I might add that the
certification provisions, currently codified in Section 489 and
490 of the foreign Assistance Act, are scheduled to expire on
September 30th. I hope this committee will work with us to retain
this very important weapon in the struggle against drugs.

Finally, let me address the Andean narcotics issue that is
probably foremost in your minds.  As you know, the United States
government has frozen assistance and intelligence sharing with
Colombia and Peru that could be used for targeting civil aircraft.
We have done so because of those government's announced policies
of firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey
orders to land.

REP. LANTOS: Just to get the record straight.  How many actual
shoot-downs took place by the Peruvians?

MR. GELBARD: I'm not certain as to numbers.  We --

MR. GELBARD: Can anyone else on the panel give us the answer? Mr.
Sheridan?

MR. SHERIDAN: I believe that we're talking in the range of three,
four, five perhaps.

REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman I'm told the answer is 31.

MR. GELBARD: But, let me ask how you're defining the --

REP. TORRICELLI: When a plane hits the ground is a shoot-down.

MR. GELBARD: The Peruvians deny that they have ever shot down an
aircraft.  .

REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah. I'm told the number is 31.  Even when I met
with them last it was in excess of 20.

REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, do you have any entry in this
sweepstakes? --(Laughter.) .

MR. CONSTANTINE: None, whatsoever..

REP. LANTOS: Well, it would be sort of nice to have our three top
experts be prepared to answer such an unbelievably elementary
question.  So let me get back to you, Secretary Gelbard --.

MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman --

REP. LANTOS: With this coaching from Congressman Torricelli, what
number would you --

MR. GELBARD: I -- I'm afraid I have to differ with Congressman
Torricelli's estimate.  The Colombian government has told us that
since they announced their policy early this year they have not
shot down any aircraft.  And the Peruvian government told us in
the course of the meetings that I held with them, when I led
delegation to both Colombia and Peru last week, they say that they
have not shot down any aircraft.  They have --

REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me -- what do
you expect them to say?  If they admit that they're shooting down
aircraft, you suspend cooperation and sharing information with
them. Of course they're going to tell you they're not shooting
down any aircraft.  But indeed when you meet with them privately
and to their own people they're giving the number of 31.  It is
indeed accurate that Colombians do not acknowledge shooting down
anyone, but the Peruvians are a very different story.

MORE.

I don't know how you could expect a different answer than the one
you're receiving, given your pledge to cease operations with them
if they give you a different answer.  It would be amazing if they
said anything differently.

MR. GELBARD: Well, with respect, Mr. Chairman, the Peruvian
government and the Colombian government have both made it very
clear to me that they do not intend to renounce their policy,
their stated policy of having the capability of going after
aircraft and shooting at or shooting down such aircraft.  But they
still stated that they have not shot aircraft down.  Now, what
they have done, and I've seen videotapes that corroborate this,
they have shot at aircraft and hit wing tips or other nonvital
parts of aircraft, and as a result, those aircraft have landed
under their own power.

REP. LANTOS: How many such incidents are we aware of where force
was used even though it was not decisive?

MR. GELBARD: We believe there are perhaps slightly more than a
dozen, perhaps around 15.

REP. LANTOS: In  Peru?

MR. GELBARD: Yes.

REP. LANTOS: How about Colombia?

MR. GELBARD: As I said, I don't believe that they have shot at any
aircraft since their stated policy has been put into place earlier
this year.

MR. SHERIDAN: And let me -- if I could, Mr. Chairman, let me just
say that, when I gave a number of somewhere around five, I was
defining the issue similar to Ambassador Gelbard, which would mean
they fired at weapons but have not shot any out of the sky and
caused a crash landing.  I meant that they had fired weapons at
and perhaps caused some damaged aircraft, but those aircraft
landed under their own power.  And I think five, 10, somewhere in
there is the appropriate number.

REP. TORRICELLI: If we are, though, Mr. Chairman, defining this as
firing at aircraft rather than downing aircraft, then the
conclusion that the Colombians are not engaged in this is also
then not correct.  (Break in audio) -- crashed after firing.  They
have fired at wings and at our aircraft, just not brought them
down.  .

REP. LANTOS: Congressman Smith?

REP. CHRIS SMITH (R-NJ): I'd just point out that in The Dallas
Morning News, May 14th, '94, it points out that Peru intercepted
about 75 planes last year according to the spokesman at the
embassy, and they point out that Peruvian jets haven't shot down
planes, but they have crashed in trying to evade pursuit.  I mean,
we may be playing -- they may be playing a game here as the
gentleman from New Jersey pointed out.  I mean, they crashed while
being pursued, perhaps with some bullets or some other coordinates
helping them to crash.

REP. LANTOS: Go ahead, Mr. Gelbard..

MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  The U.S. government has
frozen assistance and intelligence-sharing with Colombia and Peru,
as I said, that could be used for targeting civil aircraft.  We
have done so because of those governments' announced policies of
firing on suspected narcotics traffickers who refuse to obey
orders to land.  I do not need to tell you how important these two
countries are to a successful counternarcotics strategy in the
Andes.

Indeed, with Colombia and Peru, there is no air interdiction
strategy in the Andes. We took this decision very seriously.

We did not freeze this assistance because of an interagency
dispute or because of a decision to downgrade our relations with
these two countries or as part of a general retreat on
counternarcotics. The Department of Defense and other agencies
suspended their assistance in order to review policy implications
in light of actions by Colombia and Peru.  After that, an
interagency legal review led by the Department of Justice
concluded that we could not provide this assistance without risk
of violating United States criminal law.

This is not an easy issue susceptible to a sound bite solution.
There is a fundamental conflict between our long-standing policy
of maximum protection for civil aircraft in flight and our equally
long- standing policy of stopping narcotics traffickers.  We
searched for a solution that would not undercut either.  I spent
much of last week in almost nonstop negotiations in Bogota and
Lima seeking such a solution.  A simple solution under existing
law simply was not there.

The president, as you are aware, has now made his decision,
though, on this policy.  The administration will send up as soon
as possible proposed legislation that permits us to resume
intelligence- sharing and assistance to both Colombia and Peru.  I
spoke this morning with officials from both governments, Colombia
and Peru, and I hope that we can announce soon interim agreements
that permit us to resume our counternarcotics cooperation even
while our legislative proposal is pending before Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I will close as I began, speaking of perceptions.
Our critics argue that we are in retreat, that we are not pursuing
an aggressive counternarcotics policy.  That is not correct.  We
have a new strategy and a new approach.  We have signaled that we
will hold all governments to an honest certification process.  We
are building on past successes.  We are confronting head on the
tension between our civil aviation and counternarcotics policies..

We appreciate the support of these committees over the years for
international counternarcotics efforts.  We will need it again as
we seek to resolve the conflict between U.S. criminal law and our
counternarcotics efforts, and I look forward to continue to
working with you.

REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Secretary Gelbard.

We'll next hear from the Honorable Thomas A. Constantine,
administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

MR. CONSTANTINE: Chairmen Lantos, Torricelli, and members of the
subcommittee, I want to thank you for this, my first opportunity
to appear before your committees and talk about DEA's role in our
international programs.

As you may know, I've been administrator of the DEA for a fairly
short period of time, a little over three months..

However, prior to taking this position, I've served in law
enforcement for 34 years, the last eight of which as
superintendent of the New York State Police.

So I have spent most of my adult life dealing with victims of
crime and have seen first-hand what happens when drug addiction
and drug problems visit communities.  I also now, in my new role,
have gotten an education, learned about the international programs
that the United States government is involved in in law
enforcement, especially as it relates to drugs.  It's given me a
new perspective and I think it has helped me a great deal in
understanding how that problem came to many of the communities
that I was familiar with in New York state.

I think it's important, however, that we not lose sight of the
fact that the international programs must go hand in hand with
what we're doing within the United States, and I'd like to talk
today about how our enforcement efforts link the international and
the domestic because they are intertwined and cannot be separated.

I think, like the ambassador had said, and some of the people on
the dais, we are at an important and critical stage in our
society. This problem of drugs and violent crime has built since
the mid-1960s. It has taken us 30 years to get into the present
deplorable state.  It will take us a sustained period of time and
a great deal of will to get out of it.  This is at a time when
resources for law enforcement and foreign assistance are very
tight.  We're required to balance the need to protect citizens
from crime in our streets with our international obligations to
overseas partners in the drug fight.

For many years, DEA has been at the forefront of this nation's
effort to dismantle international drug trafficking organizations.
We will continue to aggressively pursue those traffickers who
operate around the globe.  As administrator of the DEA, I intend
to continue those important global missions, keeping the following
principles as guiding our actions in the coming year.

First, we must recognize that cocaine and heroin traffic have
foreign sources and are foreign controlled, and the world's major
trafficking organizations are headquartered outside of the United
States.  Other nations have international obligation to address
the issues of drug production and trafficking.  DEA must and will
continue to work with the authorities in other nations to build
institutions, share intelligence and make criminal cases which
will have an impact on drug trafficking within the United States.
Simultaneously, we must enhance our domestic efforts as well,
balancing both foreign and domestic programs.  We should not and
cannot put all of our strategies and resources in the
international investigative program.  That doesn't mean that we
will lessen our pressure on the major traffickers in Colombia or
other parts of the hemisphere, but rather that we must increase
our attention on their surrogates who operate within the United
States.

The next most important thing I think to be talked about is heroin
as a resurrection within the global economy, not only the United
States, not only Western Europe, but every country in this world
is affected now by a new growth in heroin traffic.  A large part
of that is coming from Colombia.  They have developed the ability
to manufacture heroin, to bring it to the shores of the United
States and cause us an additional problem.

Let me talk a minute about the major traffickers and their
surrogates -- one foreign, one domestic..

Despite the fact that an increasing percentage of cocaine is being
shipped now to new European markets, the U.S. continues and will
continue to be the main target for shipments from the Colombian
cocaine cartels.  The Cali cartel in Colombia maintains a virtual
criminal monopoly on all of the U.S. cocaine supply.  This
criminal organization, headquartered in Colombia, depends on
producers in Bolivia and Peru and transporters in Mexico and other
Central American nations, and distribution systems within the
United States.  It also staffs the distribution organizations in
virtually every city in the United States with Colombians who
subcontract to street organizations in these cities.

DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing the cocaine supply in
the United States, targeting the cartel leaders in Colombia and
trying to eliminate their surrogate operations here in the United
States.  It is critical to gather enough information on the major
cartel leaders for indictments in the event they will ever be
brought to justice in the United States.  However, I honestly must
tell you the opportunity to bring these drug lords to justice is
less of a possibility today than it was five years ago, when
Colombia allowed extradition to the United States.  As a result,
all of the traditional law enforcement strategies that I am
familiar with, having worked organized crime cases throughout the
United States, of attacking the leaders of the criminal
enterprises cannot be implemented against the Cali cartel. They
live in luxury, virtually immune from punishment as they profit
from their enterprise.

Nevertheless, we try to operate against their money supplies,
transportation networks, chemical supplies and communications.
All of these are critical to their operation.  We work closely
with most of the law enforcement agencies in the hemisphere to
achieve that.

Equally important to the DEA are the accomplishments which have a
direct effect on United States cocaine supplies in organizations
within the United States.

This is the link which I talked about, and it's well illustrated
by a case that I was involved in when I was superintendent of the
New York State Police.  The Herrara family, with direction from
Cali, Colombia, operated a major cell in the major cities
throughout the country, one of which was in New York City.  The
state police, the New York City police and the DEA, focused on the
organization through extensive surveillances and wiretapping, were
able to identify the principals through a series of raids.

We found out very quickly, one, that their whole organization for
the year made more money than the entire DEA budget, and that is
only one of the families operating out of Cali.  All of the
decisions that are carried out in the United States are being made
in Colombia.  They tell the group which phone numbers to use, when
the load is ready to move, which loads to move, how much to pay
the workers, detail the records on the salaries..

They have a family history questionnaire that means that they know
the relatives of all of the people who are working for them, many
of them illegal aliens from Colombia, which means that they cannot
testify against the principals in the organization, for fear of
loss of family or loved ones.  There is a tremendous reluctance
for them to cooperate.  It then moves down to the next level of
violent street gangs in the United States.

These investigations have to be played from both ends, because we
find out that many of the people are replaceable, and until such
time as we can use what I think is the appropriate strategy of
arresting, prosecuting, convicting and sentencing the principals
in these organizations, we're limited to dealing with surrogates,
which is second best.  But the pressure must be kept up.  We've
got to remember, it's the violent street gangs, who shoot children
in a public housing complex in Washington Heights, are in essence
part of that whole operation.

If you have any further questions about the role of DEA, I would
be glad to put them forward, and I give you my entire statement.
The only thing that I can tell you is that I believe that this
whole situation, the violent crime and drugs, has become an
intolerable situation for people in America, and it's going to
take a dramatic resolve on the part of all of us in government and
out of government, to do something about it over a sustained
period of time.  We did not get into this problem overnight, and
we will not get out of it immediately, but I do think the next
five years will be extremely critical for the United States.

Thank you.

REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much.

Our final witness is Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary for Drug
Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense.  Mr.
Sheridan.

MR. SHERIDAN: Chairman Lantos, Torricelli, members of the
committee.  I am pleased to be here today to discuss DOD's role on
implementing the administration's source nation strategy.  There
are two quick points I'd like to make before we start with the
questioning.

First, DOD has a very strong commitment to the strategy and to our
responsibilities in South America.  The Department of Defense in
1994 will spend approximately $150 million in South America, and
that comes in light of dramatic cuts to our budget in '94 of $300
million. There are three pillars to our programs in Latin America:
first, intelligence collection and analysis; second, support for
interdiction; and third, training of host nation police and
military that are engaged in counter-drug activity.

My second point is that the Department of Defense's efforts are
consistent with the national strategy.  As you know, the
president's strategy called for a shift from the transit zone to
source nations.

MORE.

In implementing that strategy, DOD is shifting on the
international side of our effort from 25 percent of our efforts in
source nations to 37 percent of our efforts.  So you've heard much
in the papers over the last couple weeks that DOD is seeking to
walk away from South America.  The numbers speak otherwise.

Percentage of our dollars is going up, not down.

I would also note that under the leadership of the secretary of
defense over the past year, we have initiated a number of major
programs to enhance our support to South America.  We have decided
to locate an over-the-horizon radar in Puerto Rico that will cost
$25 million to start up plus $13 million a year to operate.

We've decided to go (forward with ?) tracker aircraft, at a cost
of $45 million, for use in South America.  That will cost $18
million a year in the out years to operate.  Until the trackers
come on line and the over-the- horizon radar comes on line, we are
looking to spend about 3 to 4 million dollars a year in
cooperation with the Customs Service to help them fund their
citation tracker program in South America.  And as we plan our
funding activity for '96 in the out years, we plan to
significantly enhance our support.

So DOD is engaged.  We are not walking away, and we have a number
of major programs which are already in our beginning phases of
implementation.  And those were the two major points I wanted to
make, and I'm ready for your questions.

REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much.

We'll begin the questioning with Chairman Torricelli.

REP. ROBERT TORRICELLI (D-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In 1991 I went to Peru to see President Fujimori and Colombia with
President Gaviria in enormous frustration.  The United States at
considerable expense had put radars on stations.  We were tracking
narcotraffickers, and the Peruvian and the Colombian governments
refused to intercept.  We were doing no more than intellectually
satisfying ourselves in seeing the travel routes.  As time passed,
in part due to pressure from the United States Congress, the
Peruvian government changed its policy.  The Colombian government
even adjusted its policy, and intercept policies began, resulting
in the fact that now, 780 flights of narcotraffickers last year
were tracked.  This led to 31 tons of cocaine being seized, 101
illicit airfields of narcotraffickers being found, and 31 aircraft
in Peru being forced to the ground after receiving hostile fire
from Peruvian aircraft.

This program, just when it was beginning to work, under the
insistence of the United States Congress, after the payment from
the American taxpayers, is halted.  The American people wouldn't
believe it if they hadn't seen it for themselves.

Now, what is most incredible about this, is the legal analysis is
that this is being ceased because of legal vulnerabilities of U.S.
government officials from cooperating in the program.  Let's
understand what the program is.  The United States government
tracks narco-traffickers bringing cocaine to the United States.
That information is merely provided to the Peruvian or Colombian
governments.  They pass it to their own officials, who make their
own judgements.  Peruvian aircraft tracks a narco-trafficker,
operating with no flight plan, often at night, with no lights.
The plane is approached and wing tips attempt to communicate.
There's no response. They attempt on radio communications on
multiple frequencies.  There's no response.  There's an effort to
lead them to an airport for a forced landing.  They refuse and
attempt to evade.  And then warning shots are fired.  Do you
seriously believe that there is a jury in America, of any
combination of American citizens, anywhere, under those
circumstances, that would find a liability for U.S. government
officials?

Having simply for provided information on that basis? This change
of policy stands logic on its head.

Fortunately, President Clinton, having read what was now
happening, in the Defense Department, and elsewhere in his
administration, has reversed the policy.  And this Congress, I am
certain, as soon as we get language from the executive, will pass
in short order legislation that is required, to allow cooperation
to continue.  But the question remains, in the weeks or months
that it takes to correct this change of policy, what will happen.
Is it therefore the intention of the Pentagon not in these ensuing
weeks, despite overwhelming logic, to continue to share
information?  Do we assume, in the following weeks, no further
information will continue to be shared, despite the fact that we
are now told by the Colombian government that cocaine shipments
are up 20 percent last month since the sharing of this
interdiction information has ceased?

MORE HSE FOR. AFF/GELBARD, ET AL PAGE 21 06/22/94 .

MR. GELBARD: If I may respond to that, please, I'd like to answer
in several parts.  First of all, what we intend to do -- and I
have already spoken to our ambassadors in Bogota and Lima and
spoken to authorities of those two governments -- what we intend
to do is try to establish very, very quickly interim agreements
with those governments that would permit us to resume the
provision of real-time tracking data as quickly as possible, and I
would hope even before the end of this week.

REP. TORRICELLI: And what would the substance of those agreements
include?

MR. GELBARD: The substance of the agreements would be that we
would have to continue under existing law, as I mentioned in my
oral statement, continue to ask that our data not be used for the
shooting down of aircraft.

The second part of what I wanted to say is that whether we like
the law or not, it is the law.  This was a law that was passed by
the Congress of the United States in 1984, certainly for other
purposes. It was for counterterrorism purposes.  But because of
the way this law was drafted, it was written to cover any civil
aircraft under any circumstances.

REP. TORRICELLI: And you think it was the intention of the
Congress, of the United States government in the writing of this
law taking responsibility for the Peruvian and Colombian air
forces?

MR. GELBARD: The way the law is written -- and I have to admit I
am not a lawyer, but I have read the law repeatedly and I have
sought the advice, of course, of all the legal authorities of our
government. We have been told by the Department of Justice,
particularly including the office of legal counsel, which makes
the ultimate decisions on these issues, that this law is written
in such a way as to cover any activities and the aiding and
abetting of destruction of civil aircraft in service at any time.

REP. TORRICELLI: Let me tell you something.  In all respect to my
profession, lawyers concluding that the United States government
is criminally liable for shooting down narcotraffickers because we
give information to the Peruvian and Colombian government stands
logic on its head.  There isn't a jury in the world that would
find somebody liable under those circumstances.  That is an
incredible interpretation of the law.  Somebody would have a
better chance in the ensuing months if their child is a victim of
cocaine on an American street suing the United States government
because we had the means to track narcotraffickers, they're
appearing on a radar screen, and we refuse to give the information
to the Colombian or Peruvian government to intercept them.  That
would be a better suit than attempting to hold the U.S. government
official liable because we're allowing the Colombian government to
meet their own responsibilities and independent judgment..

Does this really make sense to you?

MR. GELBARD: Congressman, it certainly didn't make sense to me
when I read it, but it is the law.  And I certainly was not
prepared to be in a position of violating the United States law,
passed by our Congress, especially once I found out we were
subject to the death penalty.  And the idea of pursuing policies
which --

REP. TORRICELLI: Have you gone to the authors of this legislation
to try to decipher their legislative intent?

MR. GELBARD: The Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department
did look at this.  They have done an extensive legal opinion on
this and this was the subject of truly extensive --

REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, 435 members of this House voted on
that legislation.  You will not find one statement in the
Congressional Record to support legislative intent.  You will find
no committee hearing, you will find no author of the legislation
who would support that interpretation of the law of liability.
Not only will you find it, I suspect some lawyer in the Justice
Department who wrote this interpretation, who never did so much as
open their window to hear the outside noise, never asked anybody
whether that was anybody's legislative intent.  This has been
written in a vacuum, and it is an incredible betrayal of the
American people and a fundamental national interest.

Let me -- Mr. Chairman, you've been gracious with the time.  Let
me just move quickly, if I could --

MR. GELBARD: Could I just add one other point, please?

REP. TORRICELLI: Yeah, sure.

MR. GELBARD: You mentioned 1991 in Peru.  Let me add, though,
another aspect of this problem.  Nineteen ninety-one also marked
the year when we ceased providing economic support funds and
military assistance funds to the government of Peru, because the
Congress decided that we could not disburse such funds because of
certain conditions that were provided.  So, as of today, we have
approximately $77 million in economic support funds that we have
not been able to disburse, and as a result not used to support
activities to eradicate coca through alternative development
programs, nor have we been able to provide the military assistance
that we have requested because of these actions.  .

REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Gelbard, as you know, aid to Peru was
suspended for a variety of reasons.  One of those reasons, much to
my great embarrassment, is that I went in that year and saw
President Fujimori and I said, "I will not be part of using
American taxpayers' money for counternarcotics operations in your
country when you get this radar information and then you won't
intercept the narco- traffickers.  If you're serious about this
and you want American cooperation, shoot at the narco-
traffickers." They thought about it for a long time and they
didn't want to do it.  They finally agreed, now to find out that
the United States government disagreed with this Congress and
pulls away from the cooperation when they were finally starting to
help..

MR. GELBARD: I would still like --

REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Sheridan --

MR. GELBARD: -- very much to be able to have those funds so we
could get to the heart of the problem, which is the eradication of
coca.  And I would ask for the assistance of this committee in
freeing up those funds, whether as cash transfers or as project
funds, so that we can use this to support their efforts to
eradicate coca.  Because that's what gets to the heart of the
problem.

REP. TORRICELLI: Mr. Gelbard, I suspect at the moment that such
damage has been done to our cooperation with Colombia and Peru and
narco-trafficking, that if the funds are available to you, you're
going to have a hard time getting the same degree of cooperation.
These Peruvian and Colombian officials were vilified in their own
countries for allowing the United States military to fly over
their airspace, to do operations, to take information for the
United States Air Force, to do shootdown operations against narco-
traffickers.  This was not good politics for Peru and Colombia,
but theyd did it.  They did partially at the request of members of
this Congress, and now to have it shut off humiliates them and I
think is a setback that's going to be very difficult to reverse.

Mr. Sheridan, finally, if I could, with all due respects to the
intensive interest of the United States military in helping in
narco- trafficking interdiction, every six months for the last
four years I have had to call successive secretaries of defense
and ask that their intentions to close down these radars be
reversed.  First, it was the Persian Gulf War.  The radars are
needed in the Middle East.  By all means, take them away.  Then it
took months to get them back.  And then six months later, they
were needed somewhere else.

And then six months later they wanted to close them down again.
if indeed the United States military has reached the point that
they want to help and they are committed to fight against narco-
trafficking, I will tell you there is precious little evidence of
it.

I know that members of the United States military did not join to
fight narco-traffickers.  It was for other and very admirable
goals. This is a dirty and a nasty business.  And I don't blame
you for not wanting to be part of it.

But a principal national security need of the United States today
is no longer the Cold War.  It is narcotraffickers.  And operating
these radars and keeping them there. And people, like members of
this having to call and fight to keep them on station and now to
share the information is not evidence of a strong commitment in
the fight against narco traffickers.

MR. SHERIDAN: Mr. Chairman, I can't speak to what happened during
the previous administration.  I can only say that during this
administration I think the record speaks for itself in terms of
our allegation of resources.  I don't know a more exact measure of
commitment than you're willingness to put dollars to it.

And as I stated in my opening comments, under this secretary of
defense we have committed to a -- (word inaudible) -- in Puerto
Rico at a cost of $25 million up front, $13 million a year the
outyears, $45 million up front, $18 a year in the outyears for
tracker aircraft, helping the customs service in the meantime at a
cost of 3 to $4 million per year to fly their tracker aircraft,
and we have significantly enhanced our support in our five-year
planning process..

I don't know what more you want from this administration.

REP. TORRICELLI: Well, Mr. Sheridan, here's what I -- here's what
I'd like.

MR. SHERIDAN: Yes.

REP. TORRICELLI: Last fall, President Gaviria of Colombia sent a
message to this committee that the radars were about to be
removed, would I call Secretary Perry's office.  I did.  Six
months before that, I got a call from President Gaviria the
Pentagon was going to remove the radars, would I call Secretary
Aspin.  I did.  A good evidence of the commitment of the military
would be to stop trying to find every excuse to get out of
Colombia, to close down the radars, to cease cooperation, and
instead, to accept this as a national priority. And the refusal to
share this information is not a good example of it being of a high
national priority.

Mr. Gelbard, finally -- I know my time has expired here -- but if
indeed we're going to have a gap now of several weeks or months
before this Congress can pass legislation which I will introduce
the moment it arrives on this Hill to correct this incredible
legal misinterpretation, why do we not now simply transfer or
lease these radars, allow the Colombians to operate them, to
separate ourselves from this alleged liability so there's no
interruption in interdiction?

As I said, Congressman, I am hoping to be able to work out
arrangements on an interim basis with the two governments involved
in the next day or two.  I just spoke earlier with the Colombian
ambassador, and we may be meeting even this afternoon.

REP. TORRICELLI: Okay, well, let's leave it this way.

MR. GELBARD: But in the mean --

REP. TORRICELLI: If for any reason this cannot happen, can we then
agree that if we're going into next week, given the fact that we
are seeing a 20 percent upward spike in cocaine trafficking since
this interruption has taken place, that we can instead find more
imaginative means in the interim -- if we have to go to a lease,
if we have to go to a temporary transfer, something to separate us
from liability but continue the operations, that we will do so?

MR. GELBARD: I think the issue, even more than the ground-based
radars, though, is the airborne platforms, which we cannot
provide, but I am fully confident we will be able to work out
these interim arrangements before the end of the week.

REP. TORRICELLI: Could you -- could you comment briefly on the
allegations today in the media?  It is alleged that during the
recent Colombian presidential campaign, representatives of the man
who is now to become the next president of Colombia, Ernesto
Samper, received in excess of $800,000 in campaign contributions
from the Cali cocaine cartel..

Could you comment on those allegations and the videotapes that are
now circulating giving evidence of that transfer?

MR. GELBARD: First, they are audio cassettes, or an audio
cassette.

REP. TORRICELLI: There are both.

MR. GELBARD: Second, I believe that the sums that have been
described, from the transcripts I've seen that were released in
Colombia, are actually substantially more in terms of funds that
were allegedly received.

REP. TORRICELLI: Well, one videotape has $800,000 in cash.

MR. GELBARD: Yeah, I've heard --

REP. TORRICELLI: I'm told the total number is $3.5 million.

MR. GELBARD: Well, I think it's actually more.  I think it's about
$6 million.

Obviously, this is the worst kind of information that we could
receive.  We are looking into this to try to determine the
veracity of any and all of this kind of information.  This, if
true, would obviously have the most serious effect on not only any
kind of bilateral relationship with that government, but obviously
would create the most serious problems in terms of fighting
counternarcotics.

But we take this extremely seriously and we are investigating this
very intensively right now.

REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


--
--------------------------------------------------------------------
"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
 under conditions of absolute reality"
    -- Shirley Jackson
    The Haunting of Hill House

Chris T. Hugins ([e-mail])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: [phone]   Fax: [phone]

=============================================================================

Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [e-mail] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere, Part Two
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:07:52 GMT

[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [e-mail] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 01:06:53 GMT ]

      Copyright 1994 Federal Information Systems Corporation
                        Federal News Service
                      JUNE  22, 1994, WEDNESDAY

Section: Capitol Hill Hearing
Headline: Joint Hearing Of The International Security,
International Organizations And Human Rights Subcommittee And The
Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee Of The House Foreign
Affairs Committee
Subject: U.S Anti-Drug Strategy For The Western Hemisphere

Chaired By:
Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca)
Representative Robert Torricelli (D-Nj)

Witnesses:
Robert Gelbard,
 Assistant Secretary Of State For International Narcotics Matters,
Thomas Constantine,
 Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
Brian Sheridan,
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense

Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, Dc

...

REP. LANTOS: Before turning to Mr. Gilman, I'd like to just
explore a couple of issues that have been raised.

What happened on May 1 that compelled us to stop sharing
information?  Why was May 1 different from April 30, April 29 or
May 2?  What was the magic of that May 1 date?  Secretary Gelbard?

MR. GELBARD: I'm afraid I can't answer that.

REP. LANTOS: Well somebody made the decision.  Who, in your
judgment, made that decision, that on May 1 cooperation ceased? .

MR. GELBARD: The decision was made by the Department of Defense.

REP. LANTOS: Mr. Sheridan, why was the Department of Defense ready
to share information on April 30 and April 29 and April 28, and
all the proceeding months, and suddenly stopped sharing
information?

MR. SHERIDAN: There was a concern at the department, it was voiced
in the interagency some time previous to that, that we were having
problems, legal problems, with what could be done with our
information.  I would disagree respectfully with Chairman
Torricelli. The assets that we provided down there were never
intended by the previous administration or this one to shoot down
aircraft.  They were intended to provide information that could be
used to support ground- based end games, which the chairman I
think did describe quite accurately..

They have been successful in leading to ground operations which
have destroyed airfields and seized cocaine on the ground.  They
were never intended to provide information to shoot down aircraft
in flight.  And when it became apparent that the Colombians and
Peruvians wanted to do this, which was inconsistent with long-
standing U.S. policy and with agreements that we had with them, we
knew that we had a potentially large problem on our hands and we
decided that, given the ongoing nature of the discussions we were
having and the sense that we couldn't bring this to a close, that
we needed to protect DOD personnel and cease providing that while
we sort this out.

REP. LANTOS: Now, Secretary Gelbard testified a minute ago that he
has every expectation that before the end of this week, he will
work out temporary arrangements that will achieve the goal of
continuing to provide information.

Am I quoting you correctly?

MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.

REP. LANTOS: Well, if you have the ability, Secretary Gelbard, to
make this arrangement within the next 48 hours, what prevented the
Department of State from doing this between April 27 and May 1, so
we wouldn't have had this absurdity of stopping this abruptly,
causing all of the consequences that we have been discussing, and
now having to come to us with legislation that presumably is not
needed because you will be able to arrange the desired result
without legislation?

MR. GELBARD: What I said before, Mr. Chairman, is that, given
current law, we will be seeking interim agreements with those
governments that any U.S.-provided tracking data not be used for
shooting at or shooting down aircraft.  Both governments have told
me that if there is a long-term solution in sight, they are
prepared to work out shorter-term interim arrangements along these
lines.

REP. LANTOS: Well, what prevented the Department of State from
doing this two months ago?

MR. GELBARD: Because neither government was prepared, given the
lack of a change in U.S. policy at that time, to work out such
agreements because of their stated policies of shooting down or
shooting at aircraft.

REP. LANTOS: I don't understand the change in status or
attitudes..

MR. GELBARD: When I was in Bogota and Lima during the last two
weeks, we --

REP. LANTOS: No, go back to March and April.  The Department of
Defense is testifying that in interagency meetings, they were
threatening to terminate this activity..

Is that accurate?

MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.

REP. LANTOS: Is it also accurate that the Department of State was
fully aware of that?

MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.

REP. LANTOS: So it didn't come as a surprise to you that on May 1
the Department of Defense stopped its sharing of information?

MR. GELBARD: They informed us that they would.

REP. LANTOS: How far in advance?

MR. GELBARD: I can't recall.

REP. LANTOS: Approximately.

MR. GELBARD: Several days before.

REP. LANTOS: Just several days?

Mr. Sheridan, when did DOD advise the other -- who were -- who was
it participating in the interagency discussions, in addition to
State and Defense?

MR. SHERIDAN: Most of these discussions took place -- and we have
interagency working group meetings about every two weeks, and
there's a whole cast of characters who attend those meetings.

REP. LANTOS: At that point, to the best of your recollection, did
DOD advise the others that you will cease sharing information on
May 1?

MR. SHERIDAN: On April 20, the undersecretary of defense sent a
letter to the undersecretary of state notifying him of DOD's
intention unless we receive those assurances.

REP. LANTOS: And what was the response from the Department of
State?

MR. SHERIDAN: I would yield to Ambassador Gelbard.  .

REP. LANTOS: What was the response, Secretary Gelbard?

MR. GELBARD: We did not agree with their decision.  We did not
send a written answer, but we did not agree with them and we told
them that.

One thing I would like to stress, though, Mr. Chairman --

REP. LANTOS: Well I still -- I still need an answer to my previous
question.

You are now telling these committees that within 48 hours you will
be able to arrange a satisfactory interim solution. Is that
correct?

MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.

REP. LANTOS: Well, if that is the case, then my question still
stands: Why, having received a letter from the deputy secretary of
defense on April 20th, telling you that they will cease sharing
information, why did not Department of State come up with this
interim solution?

MR. GELBARD: Because those governments were not prepared, as we
saw during our visit to those two countries last week, to accept
that kind of interim solution or that kind of solution as a long-
term solution, unless there was going to be a chance in U.S.
policy.  They urged us to change our policy, but at the time and
until yesterday, when the president made his decision, there was
no change in U.S. policy envisioned..

REP. LANTOS: But why was this change of policy coming about in
such a leisurely fashion?

MR. GELBARD: We have not been taking this in any leisurely
fashion.  This has been examined very intensively.  We have been
struggling with this issue which is a very complicated one and we
have not been happy about this in the slightest, none of us.  But
this has been a serious problem and we do take the law of the
United States very seriously.

REP. LANTOS: Everybody takes the law of the United States very
seriously.

Apparently on April 30th -- was that law in effect on April 30th?

MR. GELBARD: Of course it was.

REP. LANTOS: Was it in effect on March 31?

MR. GELBARD: Yes sir.

REP. LANTOS: How 'bout last Christmas?

MR. GELBARD: Yes sir, the Congress had passed --

REP. LANTOS: How about a year ago this Easter?

MR. GELBARD: Yes sir the Congress had passed this --

REP. LANTOS: (Interrupts) -- So all of this time this law was in
effect.

MR. GELBARD: Yes sir.  The Congress had passed this law in 1984.

REP. LANTOS: So for ten years between 1984 and May 1, 1994, the
law was in effect and it didn't make much difference.  But
suddenly on May 1, it became an item on which this action had to
be taken by DOD.

MR. GELBARD: Let me explain two separate sets of legal issues. In
July of 1990, during the last administration, the U.S. government
did convey to the government of Colombia our concerns based on
international law that we were opposed to their using the data we
were providing them at that time for shooting down aircraft.  This
is based on the Chicago convention and the Montreal conventions.

And we told them at the time -- as I said, July of 1990 -- that if
such information provided by the United States or assistance
provided by the United States were used for shooting down
aircraft, that would have serious affect on our ability to
continue to provide such assistance.

The Colombian government only changed its policy to have a stated
policy of shooting at or shooting down aircraft earlier this year
and it was based on that change in policy that there was a new
examination of the implications of that policy on international
law.  In the course of this examination, the Justice Department
and the general counsels of the other departments of the executive
branch discovered these various domestic laws and after intensive
examination this spring, they came back to us very firmly and very
clearly and told us that we were not allowed to provide such
assistance.

REP. LANTOS: Colombia changed its policy only early this year.

MR. GELBARD: Yes sir.

REP. LANTOS: When did Peru change its policy?

MR. GELBARD: I believe a year ago.

REP. LANTOS: Well, why wasn't there an immediate change then?

MR. GELBARD: I can't answer that, sir.

REP. LANTOS: Congressman Gilman.

REP. GILMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  Your are certainly raising
some important issues..

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you're certainly raising some important
issues.

Mr. Sheridan, it's my understanding that Section 1004 of the code
of 21 USC 1503 establishing the office of drug control policy
states that, and I quote: "The head of the national drug control
program agency shall notify the director in writing regarding any
proposed change in policies relating to the activities of such
department or agency under the national drug control program prior
to the implementation of such a change." Was the director notified
of your change?  I'm talking now about the director of the
national drug control program, the Drug Czar, as we refer to him.
Had he been notified prior to the change?

MR. SHERIDAN: Well, in the interagency meetings which we discussed
there was representation from ONDCP at that meetings.

REP. GILMAN: Says that the "Agency shall notify the director in
writing regarding any proposed change in policies." Had the
director been notified, in writing, of any proposed change by the
Pentagon?

MR. SHERIDAN: Well, the --

REP. GILMAN: Can you tell us whether he was notified?  I think
that only takes a yes or no answer.

MR. SHERIDAN: Well sir, it depends on what you're calling a change
in policy.

There's been a long-standing U.S. policy that we do not fire at
civil aircraft in flight, and do not support that activity.

REP. GILMAN: Then you contend, Mr. Sheridan, that by the Pentagon
directing a cessation of the sharing of intelligence was not a
change of policy?  Is that what you're telling this committee?  Is
that your impression, that this was not a change in policy?

MR. SHERIDAN: It was not a change in policy regarding U.S. policy
toward the treatment of civil aircraft in flight.

REP. GILMAN: The cutting off of intelligence to Colombia and Peru
was not a change in our government's policy toward Colombia and
Peru?   That's an astounding response as far as I'm concerned.
What would you call it if it's not a change in policy?

MR. SHERIDAN: Well, let me just remind that it was never the
Department of Defense's intention to cease providing information.
But we had wanted and had hoped and continue to hope is that those
nations would not use out information to shoot down civil aircraft
in flight.

REP. GILMAN: Is that put down in writing someplace?  That's the
first I've heard that condition.

MR. SHERIDAN: Which condition is that?

REP. MYERS: The one you just recited, that it was your hope that
you continue to give them information but that they wouldn't use
it for some purpose.

MR. SHERIDAN: Well, that was certainly understood to be DOD's
position.

REP. GILMAN: Understood by who?

MR. SHERIDAN: It was understood by all the elements of our
government that that's what we wanted.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Sheridan, again I'm asking you, why wasn't there
a compliance with this section of the code, that any change in
policy would be provided to the director in writing?  So that the
director would have an opportunity, as this statue goes out to
promptly review such proposed change and certify to the department
or agency head in writing whether such change is consistent with
our national drug control strategy?

I don't think I'm asking for a complicated response.

MR. SHERIDAN: Well, I'm not sure what you're asking me for.  Was
there a letter sent? No, there was not.

REP. GILMAN: There was nothing in writing then provided to the
director?

MR. SHERIDAN: No.  That's right.

REP. GILMAN: So then you're in violation of the statute.  Is that
right?

MR. SHERIDAN: We did not interpret the statute that way or our
activity that way.

REP. GILMAN: Had you ever notified the director of your change in
sharing of intelligence in writing?

MR. SHERIDAN: In writing, no.

REP. GILMAN: Isn't there a task force that meets regularly on
narcotics?  Do you meet with that task force?

MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, those are the working group meetings that we
discussed earlier.

REP. GILMAN: How often do you meet with the working group?

MR. SHERIDAN: Once every two weeks or as called.

REP. GILMAN: And was the drug czar present at the working group
immediately after you changed your policy or, as you say, you made
a -- I don't know what you want to call it if it's not a change of
policy -- when you differed from what you were doing in the past?
Was he present at a meeting following that May 1st decision?

MR. SHERIDAN: There were many meetings that followed that.

REP. GILMAN: Did you discuss that with the director?

MR. SHERIDAN: This was thoroughly discussed.

REP. GILMAN: And was it discussed with Mr. Gelbard's office?  .

MR. SHERIDAN: We've been involved in nonstop discussions on this
issue every day since I don't know.

REP. GILMAN: Was it discussed with the DEA?

MR. SHERIDAN: Yes, DEA --

REP. GILMAN: Was there any difference in opinion amongst -- within
the task force with regard to this shifting of policy if it's not
a change in policy?

MR. SHERIDAN: You can discuss that with other members of the
interagency.

REP. GILMAN: I'm sorry.  I didn't understand the response.

MR. SHERIDAN: Other members of the interagency process, I think,
could speak for themselves.  I will not speak for them.

REP. GILMAN: Well, was there any difference of opinion as far as
you recall after you had made that pronouncement of a shifting of
the policy?

MR. SHERIDAN: There were a number of different -- I mean --
positions held by different agencies, but I would prefer to let
them speak for themselves.

REP. GILMAN: Well, what is your recollection?  Was there a
difference of opinion expressed by those other agencies?

MR. SHERIDAN: Regarding the interpretation of international law?

REP. GILMAN: No, regarding your shifting -- the Pentagon shifting
of the policy on exchange of intelligence.  I don't think I'm
making a very complicated question out of this.

MR. SHERIDAN: There were some agencies, I suppose, that agreed and
some that disagreed.

REP. GILMAN: Mr. Gelbard, were you present at any of these
meetings?

MR. GELBARD: Yes, sir.  I'm the chairman of the group.

REP. GILMAN: And was there any difference of opinion with regard
to those members of the task force, the working group.

MR. GELBARD: There were differences of opinion, sir.

REP. GILMAN: And did anyone raise the question of shouldn't the
director be given a notice in writing to give him an opportunity
to respond in writing?

MR. GELBARD: Members of his staff are in attendance at all those
meetings and the issue of informing him in writing, however, did
not come up.

REP. GILMAN: Had the Congress ever been notified about that time
of the change in policy?

MR. GELBARD: Not that I'm aware of.

REP. GILMAN: When was the Congress first notified?

MR. GELBARD: I can't recall, sir.

REP. GILMAN: As I recall I guess it was a newspaper notification
is the first we received.  I haven't seen any formal notification
from the task force, from the director or from your office with
regard to a -- my colleagues seem to confirm that it was a
newspaper when we first learned of the shifting of the policy.  It
seems to me that the task force ought to take a look at the
statute and get back to where the Congress intended them to be
with regard to the narcotics control strategy and any change in
the strategy.

Now according to most recent -- (word inaudible) -- reports,
there's been a 30 percent decline in coco cultivation in Peru
since the last report.  I understand that the upper Huallaga
production has gone down considerably because of a fungus.  Maybe
we ought to make use of that fungus elsewhere.  However, the
combination factors would seem to provide an ideal opportunity for
our nation and Peru to explore some new initiatives since that
irradication that's been completed by the fungus makes them now
explore new seed beds and apparantly we see a disarray in the U.S.
policy that's undermining our ability to cooperate with the
Peruvians and yet we have an opportunity now to get into these new
areas where it's going to take three to five years to provide new
growth.  And with production down, with the growers more
susceptible to counter measures, I think we're missing some great
opportunities to exploit the vulnerabilities in the cultivation
production cycle that we've seen since cultivation first exploded
in the Andean region.  I was one of the first promoters of putting
some money in the upper Huallaga valley -- $50 million initial
appropriation and try to irradicate and they still haven't spent
some of that money because the terrorists and the drug traffickers
control that whole valley.  I'm wondering what we're doing to take
advantage of this situation where the cultivation has been reduced
substantially; they're going to have to go into new beds of
productions.  What are we doing to try to take advantage of that
to see what we can do about irradicating that entire crop in that
region?

MR. GELBARD: First, we have extended all the available funds we
have to support irradication and alternative crop programs.  That
is precisely why I made my plea a bit earlier to free up the $77
million in economic support funds for Peru which has still been
frozen..

We could use those funds right now, Congressman Gilman, precisely
for the purposes that you have cited.  I agree with you 100
percent.  We are missing an opportunity if we're not able to begin
those kinds of projects to take advantage of the effect of the
significant decrease in coca production in the upper Huallaga and
other parts of  Peru.

Second, since we have had so little in the way of economic support
funds to help use to support eradication and alternative
development programs, but because it also makes sense, we are also
trying to get the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development
Bank engaged for the first time in alternative development
projects to help lure farmers away from growing coca and into
other kinds of pursuits. We're pursuing that aggressively and we
think we are making some good headway on that.

REP. GILMAN: Well I'm pleased to hear that you're taking a look at
that.  Tell me now, we have a $37 million cut made in the House
side in the State Department's INM program in the budget for '95.
That I would imagine would have a significant impact on your work,
and yet we didn't hear anything from the administration about its
efforts to do battle with that cut or to come forward and advocate
greater funding.  Have you made some efforts now to try to correct
that loss in the INM budget?

MR. GELBARD: Congressman, as I said in my opening statement, first
the decrease in fiscal year '94 from $152 million to $100 million
has hurt us enormously.

Second, while the efforts by helpful members of the House of
Representatives, such as you, have helped bring up the level to
$115 million in the House, and we continue to try to press for the
full $152 million as we did in the House and also are now trying
in the Senate, if we do not get full funding, given the more
globalized nature of this problem, particularly because of the
increasing spread of heroin trafficking, opium poppy cultivation
and the geographic increase throughout Asia and into the former
Soviet Union, we are going to have to cut back and close programs
in a number of areas.  This has just had a chilling effect on us.

REP. GILMAN: I think, Mr. Gelbard -- and I appreciate your
comments about that, and we certainly want to help, I think it
would be extremely helpful if the administration would put its
shoulder behind the wheel of what you're trying to do and raise
that funding. We have too seldom heard from this administration
with regard to the need for better funding in the drug programs.
The words out there are great and the speeches are great, but the
deeds lack any support for those words..

MORE.

And I hope that you would encourage the administration to show up
on the Hill and let us know that they're fully behind what you're
seeking to do.

I'd be pleased to yield back the balance of my time.  Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.

REP. LANTOS: (Off mike.) REP. WYNN (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sheridan, just generally speaking, from an operational
standpoint, how do you assess the success or failure of DOD's
operations in this interdiction effort?  I mean, there's obviously
a substantial loss in confidence in our ability to execute this
type of program.  What's your overall assessment?

MR. SHERIDAN: Of DOD's performance in South America?

REP. WYNN (?): Yes.

MR. SHERIDAN: I would say that over the last number of years,
principally supporting the State Department's (INMF ?) efforts and
working with DEA, we have been developing the capability to
disrupt the movement of cocaine, and I think the results are
improving every year.  I think my numbers indicate there were
somewhere around 130 metric tons seized in Latin America last
year, and that is significantly more than you would have found,
certainly 10 years ago --

REP. WYNN (?): Okay.  You're not focusing significantly on
disruption of production, is that a safe conclusion?

MR. SHERIDAN: On production?  Our efforts are designed to -- DOD's
specifically are designed to interdict the flow of either finished
cocaine or semi-finished cocaine.

REP. WYNN (?): Mr. Gelbard, my colleague jokingly suggested
perhaps we ought to use that fungus in a more systematic manner.
I think to some extent he has a point in that that's the only
thing that seems to have slowed production.  Is there any
consideration of utilizing a biological technology in this way?

MR. GELBARD: Don't think it hasn't occurred to us, Congressman.
And I say this with great hesitation in front of Congressman
Torricelli, but once again, we have laws, through the Biological
Warfare Convention and U.S. statutes, which prevent us from using
what would be biological agents.  We are trying --

REP. WYNN (?): Have there been any attempts to maybe focus that
question?  As opposed to biological warfare, to drug interdiction,
has there been any attempt to create that kind of focus?

MR. GELBARD: We are really pressing the governments of Bolivia and
Peru on eradication attempts, because as I said earlier, this is
what really gets to the heart of the problem.

REP. WYNN (?): It seems to be working in Guatemala.  What's the
problem?  You have a good record, apparently, of elimination and
eradication of poppy production -- cultivation, rather, in
Guatemala. Why hasn't that been duplicated?

MR. GELBARD: First, in Guatemala, the area that was involved was
really pretty small, although indeed you're right, the eradication
efforts have been very, very effective there.  Colombia, too, has
been working at eradicating opium poppies and they've eradicated
approximately 22,000 hectares, about 55,000 hectares --

REP. WYNN (?): Apparently that's not very significant.

I know we have a vote (on question ?).  In Colombia, apparently
there have been allegations that some of the military units are
engaged in human rights violations.  Can you comment on that?

And if so, what efforts are being made to prevent this from
happening, screening out these units or what have you?

MR. GELBARD: We have been working to assure that there is strong
end use monitoring measures for any military equipment that we
provide.

REP. WYNN (?): First of all, do you have the information on the
violations?  Do they exist or not?

MR. GELBARD: We do have reports about human rights violations, and
we have been pressing the government of Colombia about this over
time.  We have had lots of conversations with human rights
organizations in the United States and internationally, and we
feel that the Colombian government has been trying to improve its
systems to prevent human rights violations because they feel
strongly about it.

REP. WYNN (?): In view of the time, could you send me something a
little more comprehensive on this subject in terms of exactly what
we're doing, exactly the extent of the alleged violations, how
broad- based they are, and whether they have any official
sanction?

MR. GELBARD: Yes, Congressman, I will.

REP. WYNN (?): Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.,.

REP. TORRICELLI: Thank you.  Mr. Lantos is going to return in a
moment.

However, since I may not get the chance again, let me finally just
say for myself on two issues.  First, the Bush administration
certainly could be criticized for emphasizing the war against
drugs only in the growing fields of Latin America and in
interdiction while ignoring the consumption problem of the United
States.  This administration must be very careful in its
considerable and commendable enthusiasm for dealing with the
narcotics problem within the United States in terms of consumption
that our efforts at interdiction are not compromised.  Part of the
reason why there has been so much concern with this failure to
continue cooperation with Peru and Colombia, that it is final
evidence that our previous efforts at interdiction no longer have
considerable support.  That may or may not be the case, but it is
the impression, and it clearly is causing political doubts in
Colombia and Peru and is being interpreted by the narcotraffickers
as open season, leading to precipitous increases in shipments.

It would appear to me that the concern of this committee, the
attention of the media and, I suspect, the considerable attention
of the president of the United States has led to, if not a
reversal, a correction in policy that will solve this problem.  If
that is the case, I'm pleased with the hearing, it is mission
accomplished, we can get on with our business.  But it is a word
to the wise that there may be an imbalance in policy.

Finally, let me say I was in Nicaragua last week and visited the
Atlantic Coast, the Mosquito Coast..

The next policy issue this administration must address is because
of our historic differences with the Sandinista military of
Nicaragua there is no communication and no cooperation.  The
Atlantic coast of Nicaragua is open season for narco-traffickers.
There is not one patrol boat operating by the Nicaraguan
government on the Atlantic coast.  There is no interdiction.

Narco-traffickers daily are stopping their craft along that coast
for supplies and for (rations ?) without interruption.  We have to
get over the difficulties of the last decade and begin cooperating
with the Nicaraguan military, because they share some of our
interests in gaining sovereignty back over their coast.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. LANTOS: Thank you very much, Chairman Torricelli.

Let me pursue the proposed legislation that I take it will be sent
up here soon.

When do you expect that legislative draft to reach the Hill,
Secretary Gelbard?

MR. GELBARD: I'm hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that it will be in the
next day or so.

REP. LANTOS: Now, let us assume that we introduce it immediately
and Chairman Torricelli and I will introduce it, assuming that it
meets our approval immediately -- let's assume that Congress acts
expeditiously and the legislation passes.  What in essence will
that legislation call for?

MR. GELBARD: We're asking for a narrow change in existing U.S.
Criminal Code provisions on the use of force against civilian
aircraft.  There would be an exemption from criminal liability use
of force by specifically designated foreign governments facing
national security threats from drug trafficking so long as those
countries have in place appropriate procedures to protect innocent
aircraft.

We would also exempt assistance by the United States government to
those countries.  And we are doing this obviously in the context
of the very difficult conditions that we see the governments of
Colombia and Peru in right now..

REP. LANTOS: Is this legislation, proposed legislation, in any
sense in conflict with procedures and policies of international
organizations?

MR. GELBARD: At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we want to begin to
looking at changes in international conventions because there is a
feeling that they might very well -- in fact, they are in conflict
with some existing international conventions.  I have already
discussed with the governments of Colombia and Peru the issue of
developing a multilateral approach to make a similar kind of
narrow exception in the international -- relevant international
conventions through the International Civil Aviation Organization.

REP. LANTOS: Well, let's assume that International Civil Aviation
Organization does not change its policies.  Are we under those
circumstances prepared to go it -- go this way on a unilateral
basis?

MR. GELBARD: My understanding is that once we are able to affect
the necessary legislative changes in U.S. law, that we are
prepared to do so.

REP. LANTOS: Is this your understanding also, Mr. Sheridan?

MR. SHERIDAN: The Department of Defense will do what it's told, if
that is the intention of the president.  I mean, you're talking
about a hypothetical situation, and we're not there yet.  But
certainly the department is committed to the counterdrug effort
and will support the president's desire.

REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, what is your view of this proposed
legislation?

MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I've been kind of sitting here kind of
happy I wasn't either of these two for about the last hour.  --
(Laughter.) .

REP. LANTOS: We decided that since this is your first appearance,
we would give you somewhat of a free ride.  -- (Laughter.) .

MR. CONSTANTINE: One of the things that I think is important to
say, Congressman, is that -- to put all this stuff in perspective
-- is that this is just one part of a strategy on the part of law
enforcement or government to do something about the drug problem.
The providing of information if it can be done legally to other
countries and that they take action as necessary, that is some bit
of deterrence as to narcotics traffickers flying from Bolivia or
Peru into Colombia, and it's somewhat like -- it becomes
exacerbated when you say, "Well, we can't do anything about it."
It becomes public.  It's like saying you'll never chase a drunken
driver down a road again, every drunken driver will decide to
flee.  But there's a lot of other issues from the position of DEA
that I mentioned here today that we think are equally if not more
important.  The eradication seems to have seized tonnage and
tonnage of cocaine, and surely if it wasn't seized, it would be
here and cause us even more problems, perhaps at a lower price.
But the price hasn't gone up, and the amount keeps increasing or
keeps becoming available.

We look at DEA as to the seizure of narcotics if possible should
be related to the making of a criminal case against all of the
principles who are involved in the process, and I think that's
where the seizure become important.  And that's where the
intelligence information becomes vital to you to put it together.
My concern is -- other than this issue, which everybody has
addressed today, and I appreciate everybody's concern, it was an
education to me -- is that the principles involved in this
narcotic traffic presently are immune from sanction.  As long as
they remain immune from sanction, a lot of other strategies that
we have are really less effective.

REP. LANTOS: I full agree with you, and let me ask Secretary
Gelbard, why do they remain immune from sanctions?

MR. GELBARD: I'm sorry, could you --

REP. LANTOS: Why are the principles immune from sanctions?

MR. GELBARD: You mean the drug traffickers?  We are attempting and
we have had major efforts in a variety of ways to emphasize
extradition, to emphasize evidence sharing when there are either
not indictments in the United States or a prohibition on
extradition of nationals, we've made major efforts to try to help
governments develop --

REP. LANTOS: But what leverage do we have?  What leverage do we
have?

MR. GELBARD: We have the ability --

REP. LANTOS: Be specific, country by country.

MR. GELBARD: I -- we have the ability on an overall basis, because
of the certification process, to impose sanctions when we feel
those governments are not cooperating fully with us.  We have --

REP. LANTOS: We are -- leaving the kingpins immune certainly would
indicate that they are not cooperating with us.

MR. GELBARD: What we have been doing is trying to help those
governments develop cases --

REP. LANTOS: No, no, let me take you back to Director
Constantine's point.  His main complaint -- and I suspect the
American people would overwhelming agree with him -- that we are
impotent as long as the kingpins living in these countries are
immune.  Now do you agree with his basic point that they are
immune?

MR. GELBARD: No, I don't.  We have -- the governments of Colombia,
Peru and Bolivia specifically have put a number of these people in
jail, there have been other instances where major traffickers have
been killed, fleeing or in other law enforcement efforts.

REP. LANTOS: Now what is the current status of the Colombian
government's efforts to negotiate a settlement with the leaders of
the Cali cartel under the surrender decree?

MR. GELBARD: We have had a major problem with their prosecutor-
general, Gustavo Degrave (ph), who is independent from the
government, and who, as we have said publicly, as we have said
privately, as we have been fighting, has been trying to avoid
serious prosecution and asset seizure of major traffickers -- from
major traffickers in the Cali cartel.  As a result, we have
suspended any --

REP. LANTOS: So when you say independent, you mean independent for
what period of time, and how can that independence be curtailed?

MR. GELBARD: He has an independent term.

REP. LANTOS: When does that term end?

MR. GELBARD: I believe he has several more years, theoretically,
in office.

REP. LANTOS: And under no circumstances can he be removed --

MR. GELBARD: He can be --

REP. LANTOS: -- prior to the termination of his tenure?

MR. GELBARD: As I understand it, he can be removed by the
Colombian constitutional or supreme court.

REP. LANTOS: And has that been attempted?

MR. GELBARD: That has not yet been attempted, but has been under
discussion within Colombia.  We have made very clear, both
publicly and privately, our refusal to work with him because of
his misuse of U.S.-provided assistance, his lack of seriousness
about prosecution of major drug traffickers.

REP. LANTOS: Well, and what -- what's the next step.

MR. GELBARD: And we hope that -- and we have tried to encourage
the government of Colombia, particularly there, to urge that he be
removed from his position, and we have stressed this through our
unwillingness to work with him..

We feel that President Gaviria and his government, who have very
strong records of fighting against drug trafficking, are also very
dissatisfied with his performance, and they've made that very
clear. President Gaviria has come out very strongly against him
publicly.

REP. LANTOS: How about the degree of cooperation we are getting
from  Peru?

MR. GELBARD: It's a very different situation because of the fact
that the major traffickers are mostly concentrated in Colombia.
But back in January, for example, the Colombian police arrested
the leading Peruvian trafficker, they quickly deported him to
Peru, he received a life sentence, which he's currently serving,
and they are also trying to go after other major traffickers.

However, as in many of these countries, there have been serious
problems in terms of both prosecution and problems with
correction.

REP. LANTOS: Mr. Constantine, having been in the job only three
months and having a very distinguished record in the field of law
enforcement, on the basis of this very limited time frame, what
changes would you recommend in our international drug policy?

MR. CONSTANTINE: I would think that the key issue right now and
will be for the next several years is the Cali cartel because, as
the Ambassador Gelbard has said, the Colombian police at great
personal cost were very effective in dealing with the group out of
Medellin.

REP. LANTOS: Yes.

MR. CONSTANTINE: I think it was a good example for us to see how,
with the right pressure and government moving strongly against it,
how something like that can disintegrate fairly quickly.  I
honestly have to tell you, even though I'm new to this job, I've
been involved in investigations with the Cali cartel since 1985 in
New York state, substantial investigations in which major
principals were indicted for criminal violations of substantial
crimes in New York state as long ago as 1989 and have never been
brought to justice.  And I am concerned that there are that group
of people which account for at least 80 percent of all the cocaine
traffic in the United States and is suspected of many vicious
crimes, under the present constitution of Colombia, obviously,
will not be extradited to the United States.

The next question is, will they be brought to justice with the
appropriate sanctions in Colombia?  In my three months of reading
every historic report I can, I do not see that happening, and the
analogy that I have made with people, having worked organized
crime cases, it's a little like letting John Gotti sit in Howard
Beach, Queens, and go to the Ravenite (sp) Social Club and do what
he wants to do every day, and sending all of the bookmakers and
loan-sharkers to jail, while the major principal exists immune.
And one of the things that's been effective in organized crime in
this country -- I give great credit to Bobby Kennedy, who started
all this thing -- was going after the principals, using witnesses
against them, giving people breaks, all the way up the line until
you get the major figures and send them to prison..

That, to me, would be the greatest asset that you could add to all
the present tools that you have to deal with the international
narcotics cartels that operate in the United States because it's
not that they just sit over there, they direct every minute piece
of the operation that's going on in Queens or Los Angeles or
Houston.

REP. LANTOS: Mr. Gelbard, you are the government's top foreign
policy expert in this field; you have this as your responsibility.
What in your judgment makes the Cali cartel so much more resilient
compared to the Medellin cartel?

MR. GELBARD: I think it's been much more difficult to try to
develop strong cases but at the same time, we have seen enormous
difficulties on the part of individuals in terms of developing the
political will to go after them.  We have serious difficulty, as I
have mentioned before, because of Gustavo Degrave's (pp)
unwillingness to seriously approach the problem of the leadership
of the Cali cartel in a way of trying to prosecute them -- serious
cases.  We have been working with the Gaviria government, as Mr.
Constantine says, with very good success against the Medellin
cartel.  These people are indeed slicker.  They have operated in a
very different way and they have tried to create the image of
kinder, gentler drug traffickers.

In point of fact, there's still tremendous violence, many murders
and this is not a gentle group of people.  But we need strong
political will on the part of the law enforcement authorities in
Colombia to continue to go after them.  We've seen it in the
Colombian police in the past, we certainly have seen it in the
Gaviria administration.  We want to work with them and maintain
that kind of international cooperation but it's awfully difficult
when the individual charged with the prosecutions of these people
either won't do it or provides them with nothing more than slaps
on the wrist and no asset siezure.

REP. LANTOS: Is it your judgment that the government is doing
everything it can to get rid of him?

MR. GELBARD: I feel quite confident that President Gaviria's
government has tried to be very effective on this and they are
very frustrated, extremely frustrated.

REP. LANTOS: That's not a good enough answer for me.  What do you
mean by frustrated?

MR. GELBARD: Under their system, they do not have the ability to
remove him.  As I said earlier, he has to be removed by the
courts.

MORE.

REP. LANTOS: And the courts are intimidated.

MR. GELBARD: For whatever reasons --

REP. LANTOS: Well, what's your judgment?  I mean, this is not an
unusual question.  I mean, if the courts have the legal right to
remove the obstacle in the way of getting at the kingpins of the
drug world, then why don't the courts do it?

MR. GELBARD: I really don't --

REP. LANTOS: They're either paid off or they're intimidated. So,
which of the two is the answer?

MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, I really don't know the answer to that,
but I am still hopeful that DeGrave (sp) will be removed from his
position.

REP. LANTOS: Well, what is your hunch?  Are they intimidated or
are they paid off?

MR. GELBARD: I'd rather not answer that in open session.

REP. LANTOS: Well, we will have a closed session on this whole
subject because the answers, frankly, are simply unacceptable to
the American people; that this nightmare of the drug epidemic
continues because an individual in Colombia is unwilling to
prosecute the kingpins of this giant international conspiracy.

Mr. Manzullo?

REP. MANZULLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Constantine -- Constantine, forgive me -- do you have enough
DEA agents?

MR. CONSTANTINE: You mean overall?

REP. MANZULLO: That's correct.

MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I mean, that's a very tough question. I've
run police departments now for almost nine or ten years, and there
was never enough troopers, there's never enough agents, there's
never enough people from the FBI.

I think that the difficulty started three years ago when there was
gradually, I think in 1991, there was a freezing of budgets, then
successively it started to become more difficult --

REP. MANZULLO: Can I race you three years ahead to now, because
the administration is cutting the DEA budget by $2 million.  That
obviously will have some impact on the hiring of DEA agents.  It's
a very simple question.  I mean, at this point -- and I know
you've been on the job a very short period of time -- do you feel
you have enough DEA agents to carry out your program of
interdiction?

MR. CONSTANTINE: I'd have to say at this stage of the game that if
we could maintain ourselves at full strength, that we'd be able to
meet most of the missions.  But I also have to tell you -- and I'm
going to be very honest with you -- as the heroin targets start to
explode underneath us everywhere, that means that you have to look
down the road and say, gee, all that I have to do right now, with
all of the assets -- and they are not infinite, I mean they are
finite resources, and the problems are becoming infinite, so you
try to --

REP. MANZULLO: You're short of agents.

MR. CONSTANTINE: At this point in time we're about 130 over what
has become a reduced target.  I've heard on the markup on the
bills in both houses that that may very well be corrected..

REP. MANZULLO: So what's your answer?

MR. CONSTANTINE: Well, I --

REP. MANZULLO: Are you short of agents to adequately --

MR. CONSTANTINE: I can't give you the exact number of agents --

REP. MANZULLO: But you're short, is that correct?

MR. CONSTANTINE: Presently we're 130 or 140 over the target. It's
less than existed in 1991.  But there's a reduced appropriation
for the target figure --

REP. MANZULLO: No, I -- I want to lay aside all appropriations and
all the congressional legalese and all this -- all this stuff --
and ask you, as a professional police officer, and you've been in
this a long, long time and understand the issue, do you feel as of
this date that you have enough DEA agents to adequately do the
job?

MR. CONSTANTINE: No.

REP. MANZULLO: Okay.  And this is at the same time that the
administration is seeking $2 million less than your old DEA budget
-- overall DEA budget?

MR. CONSTANTINE: I'm not sure that's the figure, though,
Congressman.  I mean, I would have to check that.

REP. MANZULLO: Has the president -- is the president seeking more
funding so you can have more DEA agents?

MR. CONSTANTINE: I think the budget was hold harmless this year.
There was 10 less DEA agents in the budget.

REP. MANZULLO: How many do you need, Mr. Constantine?

MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, I mean, I would --

REP. MANZULLO: Do you have any idea?

MR. CONSTANTINE: It would be an unreasonable figure if I gave it
to you right now, because --.

REP. MANZULLO: Be unreasonable, because we --

MR. CONSTANTINE: Oh, wow.

REP. MANZULLO: -- you know --

MR. CONSTANTINE: People accuse me of that often, but I kind of --

REP. MANZULLO: That's not the case, because we're obviously here
because we feel there have been cutbacks in --

MR. CONSTANTINE: You presently have 3,500 sworn personnel for DEA
covering all of the domestic United States and 53 foreign offices.
You know, you could rise up to a number of 7,000 or 8,000.  But I
think there comes a point in time where all of us say, look, this
is the amount of money that we can afford to put into something.
I've dealt with these types of issues back in New York State
before I came here.  Because there's other people, there's people
who need rehabilitation, there's prevention programs, there's a
balance to all of these things.

As I said, I'm pretty sure correctly, in the beginning, if held
harmless at the figures for 1991, I think DEA could be very
effective in the role that we have to play.

REP. MANZULLO: But the reason I'm asking these questions is that
the President's overall request for drug control through various
programs is $13.2 billion.

That's 1.1 billion more than the 12.1 billion enacted for fiscal
year 1994.  The administration is seeking increased funds in five
areas -- drug prevention, up $448 million; drug treatment, up $360
million; drug-related criminal justice spending, up $227 million;
international programs, up $76 million; drug-related research --
whatever that is -- up $27 million.  And the White House requested
reductions in two areas: interdiction, down $94 million; anti-drug
intelligence programs, down $600,000.

I think that's the reason why we're having this hearing today,
because people in the United States Congress and the people in
America believe that there is an insincere effort on the part of
the Clinton administration to adequately stop the flow of drugs
into this country.

REP. LANTOS: If my friend will yield to me, I think this is an
appalling and totally inaccurate, unfair statement..

To accuse the administration, any American administration, of
having an insincere effort to fighting the war against drugs is
simply not worthy of a member of this body.

REP. MANZULLO: Well, I --

REP. LANTOS: And I truly believe my good friend does not -- cannot
mean what he has just said.  Partisanship has a role in political
debate, but to accuse either this administration or the previous
administration of a lack of sincerity in fighting the drug war is
not one of them.

REP. MANZULLO: Well, I will stand by my ground on that, Mr.
Chairman.  I appreciate your interjection of your thought in here,
but when it comes -- apparently when it comes to interdiction,
there is no emphasis by this administration.  And that's borne out
by the fact of the request made by the administration itself.  I
can only state to you that's how we feel.  There are many members
of Congress that feel there's been a lack of emphasis on
interdiction, and that's why my question to you was sincere,
because you're in a position where you know how short you are.
And there are many members that feel that the DEA needs more help
and want to take and channel resources from other areas into
interdiction.

So I would stand by my ground that there's a lack of sincerity in
trying to interdict the drugs, as borne out by this whole issue
with the AWACS.  Thank you.

MR. GELBARD: Mr. Chairman, if I might --

REP. LANTOS: Please.

MR. GELBARD: -- respond to that briefly.  As I said in my opening
statement, Congressman, the president's strategy concentrates on
maintaining very strong interdiction capabilities and very strong
law enforcement capabilities.  What we have been doing because of
the serious budgetary problems with which the administration is
faced have been trying to look for the most efficient ways of
pursuing these interdiction and law enforcement efforts.  And as a
result, the president's Western Hemisphere strategy calls for a
gradual shift away from the so-called transit zone interdiction
area to really trying to concentrate more on the source countries
and stopping it at the source.  That's a much more effective way
than trying to catch it just before it enters our borders.  We
still feel that is important, too, but we are trying to shift the
funds more in the direction of the source countries, where we feel
we can stop it with much greater efficiency and cost
effectiveness.

MR. CONSTANTINE: I would also add, if I could, sir, that the
administration's request this year is 9 percent over the '94
actual. And so, as far as we are concerned, the ball is in your
court, and we will see what the Congress does with the president's
request.  But given the budgetary environment that we are in, a 9
percent increase over '94 I think is a substantial commitment on
the part of the administration.

I would also note that 59 percent of our spending is still on
supply reduction.

So this notion that, you know, while there is an increased
emphasis on drug treatment and so on, that this administration is
not committed to supply reduction is imply not so. Sixty cents of
every dollar spent is still on the supply reduction side.  As
Ambassador Gelbard indicated, what we're doing is just -- on the
international side -- making some adjustments..

I would also note that international spending is up 22 percent in
this Clinton administration's '95 budget request.  So if we want
to start looking at the numbers, let's look at all of them, and I
think we do pretty well.

REP. LANTOS: Congressman Mica?

REP. MICA: Well I -- you know, I just have tremendous problems
with this the -- you know, we're talking about interdiction,
they're cutting off intelligence to Peru and Colombia.  I mean,
that's what really precipitated everything going on here.  And
when Mr. Gilman was trying to ask a question -- you know, it's
apparent to us that when the drug czar, for example, his funding
was cut, I believe, by 73 percent, with a massive layoff in his
office -- that there are members of Congress that are deeply
concerned because we're hearing from the folks back home, and I
don't want to use that same word again.  But I would expect you
gentlemen to get in there and try to scrap more for what little
federal dollars are left on discretionary spending in areas of
cutting off drugs.  I mean --

MR. GELBARD (?): Congressman, we've been trying to do this, and we
have been spending a great deal of our time trying to press for
the request that went to the Congress in the fiscal year '95
budget.  As I said earlier, my budget was reduced by a third in
fiscal year '94.  We requested $150 million, we received $100
million.  I'm afraid the same thing is happening for fiscal year
'95.  The amounts of money we have available to support
eradication programs and development to lure the farmers away from
growing coca has diminished enormously.  We simply have no funds
right now, as I responded to Congressman Gilman, to help the
Peruvian government in its efforts to eradicate coca.  Now we're
encouraging them to look elsewhere, particularly through the
development banks, and we're creating an opening there.  But we've
got serious problems with simply a lack of availability of cash
from what we've requested.

REP. LANTOS: We'll be in recess for 10 minutes and then resume
with Mr. Mica.

(Sounds gavel.) .

END OF COVERAGE

--
--------------------------------------------------------------------
"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
 under conditions of absolute reality"
    -- Shirley Jackson
    The Haunting of Hill House

Chris T. Hugins ([e-mail])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: [phone]   Fax: [phone]

=============================================================================

Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [e-mail] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: Defense Department's Counterdrug Support Programs
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:07 GMT

[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [e-mail] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:00:35 GMT ]

       Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
      Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
                     June  22, 1994, Wednesday

Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony
Headline: Testimony June 22, 1994 Brian Sheridan Deputy  Asistant
Secretary   Of  Defense  Department  Of  Defense  House   Foreign
Affairs/International Security, International  Organizations  And
Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere

    Statement Of
    Brian E. Sheridan
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense For
    Drug Enforcement Policy And Support
    At A Hearing Before The
    Subcommittee On International Security, International
    Organizations, And Human Rights And The Subcommittee
    On Western Hemisphere Affairs House Committee On Foreign
    Affairs
    June 22, 1994

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

     I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the Defense
Department's counterdrug support programs with you today.  During
the  last year DOD has significantly restructured its counterdrug
policy  in  order  to  maximize its support  of  the  President's
National  Drug Control Strategy within existing fiscal  guidance.
I  would  like to give you an overview of the new DOD counterdrug
policy  and  programs,  among which are activities  that  support
source nation counterdrug efforts in the Andean region.

     First,  I would like to touch on some of the realities  that
have been brought home very clearly to me in the year that I have
been   the  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for   Drug
Enforcement  Policy  and Support.  Foremost among  these  is  the
enormity  of  the drug problem facing our Nation.   Although  the
scourge of drug use has been displaced in the headlines in recent
years,  it is not hard to see that the issues that have moved  to
the  forefront  of  public concern - crime and healthcare  -  are
integrally connected to the problem of drug use.  While we, as  a
nation,  have  had some success in past years at  decreasing  the
casual  use of drugs, hardcore use continues unabated and,  worse
still,  recent surveys indicate that our young may be  increasing
their  use  of drugs. Drug-related crime continues to plague  our
streets.  We all see the tragic effects on the individuals  whose
lives are destroyed by drug use or drug-related violence, and  we
all  feel the resulting strain on our local communities  and  our
criminal  justice  and  healthcare  systems.   The  numbers   are
striking:  2.7  million  Americans are  chronic  hardcore  users;
10,000 Americans die because of drugs annually; and, illegal drug
use drains our economy of tens of billions of dollars each year.

     In  addition to the horrors inflicted by drugs  in  our  own
country, drug trafficking continues to threaten the integrity  of
Latin American democracies. Narcotraffickers have repeatedly used
violence  and  corruption to try to undermine  the  legislatures,
judiciaries,  militaries,  and  police  in  Latin  America.    In
Colombia  alone, hundreds of innocent citizens have  been  killed
and  thousands  injured by the drug cartels.  Furthermore,  there
has  been  insufficient attention given to the  ecological  harms
inflicted  by  the cultivation and processing of  illegal  drugs.
Slash and burn farming techniques have been used to increase  the
production  of  coca  and  poppies,  and  the  runoff  of   large
quantities of precursor chemicals used to manufacture cocaine  is
polluting the environment.

     Given  the complexity of the issues surrounding drug use,  I
have become convinced that there is a need for increased dialogue
among  the Defense Department, Congress, and the American  people
about  the  role  of  DOD in the counterdrug  effort.   When  the
Defense  Department  was drafted into the counterdrug  effort  in
1989, many people held out the hope that military involvement was
the  answer  to  our Nation's drug problem; the term  "drug  war"
misleadingly implied that, with a concerted effort, the  military
could engage the enemy and bring victory.  We must recognize that
illicit  drug use is a deepseated social problem which, like  the
problems  of  crime  and  inner-city poverty,  will  have  to  be
addressed  by  all  Americans  over  the  long-  term.   As   the
President's  recently  announced National Drug  Control  Strategy
indicates, the Federal counterdrug effort should involve multiple
agencies cooperating to address the drug issue simultaneously  on
a  variety  of fronts.  The Defense Department, with  its  unique
assets and capabilities, has a critical, but supporting, role  to
play in that effort.  Any assessment of DOD's contribution should
be  made  in  this  context, and with an eye  toward  incremental
progress.

     It  is  my belief that through effective strategic planning,
and  increased  dialogue  with the  Congress  and  other  Federal
counterdrug   agencies,  we  can  better  articulate   reasonable
expectations  for  the  wide  variety  of  counterdrug   programs
executed  by DOD.  Given that more than three times as much  coca
is  currently produced than is needed to satisfy the U.S.  demand
for  cocaine,  it  is  not  realistic to  expect  Federal  supply
reduction  efforts  to significantly limit  the  availability  of
cocaine in the near-term.  There are, however, a number of  goals
that  coordinated  Federal efforts can be  expected  to  achieve,
including: disrupting the cocaine cartels, raising the  costs  of
drug trafficking, and denying traffickers their preferred methods
and  routes,  in  particular the ability  to  fly  directly  into
Florida  and  over the Southwest border.  The Defense  Department
has  contributed  to significant successes in  these  areas.   In
1993, DOD support activities led directly to the seizure of  over
100 metric tons of cocaine that would otherwise have ended up  on
U.S.  streets,  and  thereby  denied traffickers  the  associated
profits.

     During the last year I have taken a number of steps to  more
aggressively  manage  DOD's counterdrug  programs  and  resources
which  previously had grown at an explosive rate.  As  you  know,
the DOD counterdrug budget rose from $380 million to $1.1 billion
between  Fiscal  Years  1989  and  1993.   Last  summer,  at   my
suggestion,  the  Department initiated an internal  Comprehensive
Review of DOD counterdrug activities that was conducted by a team
consisting  of representatives of the Office of the Secretary  of
Defense,  the  Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence  Agency.
The  Review  Team  evaluated  the operational  impact  and  cost-
effectiveness  of  each  of DOD's 170 counterdrug  projects  with
respect  to National objectives, and recommended $135 million  in
cuts   to   specific  programs  which  were  deemed  of   limited
operational  impact.   When  the  DOD  counterdrug   budget   was
significantly reduced in the FY 94 Appropriation process,  rather
than  allocate the undistributed reductions across the board,  we
directed cuts based on the findings of the Comprehensive  Review.
As  a  result, twenty-four programs that had been found to be  of
insufficient utility have been terminated.  The level of  funding
for  numerous other programs was decreased in favor of more cost-
effective   alternatives,   while   bringing   the   Department's
activities  in  line  with the priorities of  the  National  Drug
Control  Strategy. This restructuring, which I will  describe  in
more  detail in a moment, has been implemented in FY  94  and  is
still  being refined.  The Department recommends continuing  this
strategy and programmatic initiative which is reflected in the FY
95  budget request.  As a mechanism for analyzing the results  of
the  restructuring,  and in order to ensure  that  the  level  of
accountability  for  DOD  counterdrug expenditures  continues  to
rise, I have established a working group of experts, with members
from  relevant  divisions under the Office of  the  Secretary  of
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, to
serve   as   a  quasi-Board  of  Directors  for  DOD  counterdrug
activities.    This   group  will  review   counterdrug   program
effectiveness on an ongoing basis, and consider additional policy
initiatives.   I will now more specifically describe  the  policy
and programs that DOD is implementing.

    Background

     As  you  are  aware, DOD was given a number  of  counterdrug
responsibilities in 1989.  Specifically, DOD was:
(1) assigned the lead role in the detection and monitoring of the
air and maritime transport of illegal drugs;
(2) tasked to integrate the command, control, communications, and
tactical  intelligence counterdrug assets  of  Federal  agencies;
and,
(3)  directed  to  approve and fund Governor's  State  Plans  for
National  Guard  counterdrug support efforts in each  of  the  54
states and territories.

    DOD has effectively executed and continues to execute each of
these  missions, developing an integrated DOD counterdrug program
involving  the  operational activities of five  supported  CINCS.
These activities have been in support of U.S. and Host Nation law
enforcement  agencies; DOD personnel have not engaged  in  direct
law enforcement activities such as arrests and seizures.

    Impetus for Refocusing DOD Counterdrug Policy

     Despite  the  combined efforts of DOD and the other  Federal
agencies  with counterdrug responsibilities, the flow of  cocaine
and  other illegal drugs into the U.S. continues to constitute  a
critical threat to National security.  The Clinton Administration
has  clearly  articulated a multifaceted strategy for  addressing
the myriad of problems associated with illicit drug use.  In both
the  Interim  National  Drug Control Strategy  and  the  recently
released  1994 National Drug Control Strategy, President  Clinton
has  called for an integrated Federal effort with increased  drug
education,   prevention  and  treatment,  as  well   as   renewed
commitment to supply reduction activities.  Domestically,  supply
reduction efforts are to give priority to the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's) and are to be supported by  increased
funding  for  community policing.  With respect to  international
supply  reduction, the new National Strategy directs a controlled
shift in emphasis from the transit zone to the source nations  of
Colombia, Bolivia, and  Peru.

     In  response  to  the new Presidential  direction  from  the
National Strategy, and incorporating the findings of our internal
Comprehensive  Review,  the  Department  of  Defense  issued  new
counterdrug  policy  guidance in October, 1993.  Signed  by  then
Deputy  Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, the  new  guidance
refocused DOD counterdrug policy around five strategic elements:

(1) support to cocaine source nations;
(2) intelligence support targeted toward dismantling cartels;
(3) detection and monitoring of the transport of illegal drugs;
(4)   support   to   domestic  drug  law  enforcement   agencies,
emphasizing  the Southwest border and other High  Intensity  Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA's); and
(5)  demand  reduction. .1 will discuss the plans and  objectives
within each of these five strategic elements in a moment.

     It  should be noted that while cocaine consumption continues
to  pose  the  greatest drug problem in the  United  States,  and
continues  to  be the top priority of the National  Drug  Control
Strategy, the increasing supply and purity of heroin in the  U.S.
warrants  increased attention.  Colombia's role as a supplier  of
heroin  in  the  Western  Hemisphere is growing,  and  there  are
increasing  reports  of  opium cultivation  in   Peru.    DOD  is
committed to assisting increased law enforcement efforts aimed at
heroin  kingpins and their organizations.  However, in  light  of
the  fragmented  and complex nature of the heroin  industry,  any
support  provided  by  DOD must be applied judiciously.   DOD  is
currently  involved  in  an interagency  process  to  review  and
strengthen our international heroin strategy which will result in
recommendations  submitted  to the President  for  approval  this
year.

    New DOD Counterdrug Policy

     1)  Source Nation Support - The new National Strategy  calls
for  increased  support  to those nations  that  demonstrate  the
political  will  to  combat narcotrafficking.  Specifically,  DOD
will  focus  its  supporting efforts in the Andean  countries  of
Colombia,   Bolivia,  and  Peru.   Support  will  be   aimed   at
strengthening  the  democratic  institutions  in  these  nations,
encouraging  national  resolve  and  regional  cooperation,   and
further  developing  air  sovereignty  and  ground-based  endgame
(effective   arrest  and  prosecution)  capabilities   with   the
objective   of   moving  these  nations  toward   self-sustaining
counterdrug programs. DOD will achieve these goals by  providing,
to  the  extent  feasible  and effective,  consistent  with  law,
training  and  operational support to source  nation  police  and
military   units   with   counterdrug  responsibilities   through
deployments funded by security assistance or counterdrug  funding
--  primarily by utilizing authority under Section 1004 of the FY
91  National  Defense Authorization Act as amended, and  Sections
517  and  506(2)(A)  of the Foreign Assistance  Act  of  1961  as
amended.   All  source nation activities will be accomplished  in
cooperation with the Host Nations, and under the auspices of  the
U.S.  State  Department.  As in the past, DOD personnel  will  be
prohibited  from engaging in, or accompanying Host Nation  forces
on, law enforcement operations.

     The Department understands the need for vigilant sensitivity
to  the danger of human rights abuses in the Andean region.   For
this  reason  all DOD training of Host Nation forces  includes  a
human rights component.  Furthermore, the Defense Department,  in
coordination  with the State Department's Bureau of International
Narcotics  Matters, has established standard operating procedures
for  end use monitoring of U.S.supplied equipment.  Additionally,
DOD  has  strengthened  its  end  use  monitoring  practices   by
requiring  all Department personnel who deploy to  the  field  to
verify  the  presence and use of U.S. supplied equipment  at  the
unit or site they are visiting.

     In  the last year U.S. efforts to bolster the political will
and  the  enforcement capabilities of source nations have yielded
encouraging   results.   One  of  the   largest   Peruvian   drug
traffickers,  Demitrio  Chavez  Penaherra,  aka  "Vaticanon,  was
arrested in Colombia and expelled to Peru where he was prosecuted
for  narcotrafficking and treason; he is now serving  a  30  year
sentence.   Moreover,  the end of the eighteen-month  pursuit  of
Pablo  Escobar  marked the demise of the once  dominant  Medellin
cartel.   Additionally,  the  government  of  Bolivia,  in  joint
operations  with  the  Drug  Enforcement  Administration   (DEA),
dismantled four major cocaine trafficking organizations in  1993.
No  one is under any illusions that fighting drug traffic in  the
Andes  is  less complicated than it has ever been, but we  should
look  to  these  recent successes as reasons for  hope,  and  for
lessons about what types of programs work.

     In  addition to the DOD programs that directly assist source
nation  counterdrug efforts, a number of the programs which  I'll
describe  below as part of other strategic elements  of  the  DOD
counterdrug  policy also support U.S. objectives  in  the  Andean
region.   It  is important to understand that the DOD counterdrug
policy  is designed to support the multifaceted approach directed
by  the National Drug Control to exert pressure on the drug trade
from a variety of angles simultaneously.

     2)  Dismantling the Cartels - Among the most  cost-effective
contributions  which  DOD  can make  to  cooperative  counterdrug
efforts  is  bringing its intelligence capabilities  to  projects
that  target  trafficking organizations.  DOD  is  enhancing  its
support  of  the  DEA's  Kingpin  Strategy  and  the  Counterdrug
Community's   Kingpin  Linear  Approach  which  are  specifically
designed  to  dismantle  the  cocaine  cartels  and  the  cocaine
business.   DOD is also enhancing support to drug law enforcement
agencies  through  the use of Section 1004 authority  to  provide
translator  and  intelligence analyst support, and  by  expanding
intelligence  gathering and sharing programs.  Additionally,  the
FY 95 budget request reflects DOD's funding for the National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC).

    3) Detection and Monitoring of the Transport of Illegal Drugs
-  DOD  will  support domestic law enforcement  and  host  nation
detection and monitoring efforts by:
(a)  emphasizing  activities in the cocaine source  countries  of
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru;
(b)  streamlining  activities in the  transit  zone  (the  region
between  the  source countries and the U.S. border region),  with
detection  and monitoring efforts focused toward intelligencecued
operations that directly support the Kingpin Linear Approach  and
source country and arrival zone operations; and
(c)  refocusing activities in the U.S. to emphasize  the  cocaine
threat at critical border locations.

      The  use  of  more  cost-effective  technologies  (such  as
relocatable- over-the-horizonradars (ROTHRs), and refitted  TAGOS
Radar  Picket  ships), in place of some of the more  costly  ship
steaming and flying done in the past, is allowing DOD to maintain
a  robust and flexible detection and monitoring capability in the
transit zone.  The ROTHR operating in Chesapeake, Virginia, since
early  1993  has provided promising results.  The addition  of  a
second  ROTHR, scheduled to be operational in FY 95, will  render
more complete coverage of the transit area.  Additionally, in  FY
95  we hope to begin site preparation for a ROTHR in Puerto  Rico
that will improve coverage of the source nation area.

     4)  Direct Support to Domestic Drug Law Enforcement Agencies
(DLEAs)-Emphasizing the Southwest Border and other High Intensity
Drug  Trafficking  Areas DOD will continue  to  directly  support
domestic DLEAs through:
(a)  a  Detailee  program  that provides  intelligence  analysts,
translators, and support personnel;
(b)  a  program implementing Section 1004 of the National Defense
Authorization  Act  (NDAA) of Fiscal  Years  1990  and  1991,  as
amended,  that  provides  transportation, maintenance,  equipment
upgrades and other forms of support;
(c) a program implementing Section 1208 of the NDAA that provides
excess  DOD  equipment to Federal, State and local DLEAS  through
four regional logistical support offices; and
(d)  the Governors' State Counterdrug Plans that use the National
Guard to support DLEAs and drug demand reduction activities.

     DOD  is  developing comprehensive prioritization  plans  for
requirements  submitted  under these  programs,  emphasizing  the
importance  of  efforts at the Southwest border  and  other  High
Intensity  Drug Trafficking Areas.  If allowed by  Congress,  the
Department  will increase funding support for the  Section  1004-
program.   In  addition,  DOD will continue  to  support  Federal
counterdrug  law enforcement agencies in addressing  multi-agency
counterdrug  command,  control,  communications,  and   technical
intelligence  problems.   DOD  is also  aggressively  pursuing  a
research  and development program for cargo container  inspection
systems.    The   technologies  being   explored   utilize   very
sophisticated   X-ray  and  nuclear  techniques   and   will   be
demonstrated  at testbed sites in Otay Mesa, California,  Tacoma,
Washington, and at relocatable systems testbeds on the  Southwest
border.

     5)  Demand  Reduction - All Military Department and  Defense
Agency  drug  testing and education programs will  be  continued,
with an emphasis placed on increased regionalization, automation,
and consolidation of testing. Additionally, DOD will continue the
community outreach demand reduction pilot program directed by the
FY  93  Defense Authorization Act.  As part of the  pilot  study,
each  of  the  Military Departments and the  National  Guard  are
running programs which use military personnel as role models  and
target at-risk youth. We are currently reviewing the efficacy  of
these  programs,  and  a report and accompanying  recommendations
will be sent to Congress this fall.

     These  five strategic elements form the basis for a  focused
DOD counterdrug program which directly supports the National Drug
Control  Strategy.  It is within this framework that we  evaluate
the  efficacy  of  each  of  our  many  different  projects.   As
discussed  earlier,  the  reductions in the  Department's  FY  94
counterdrug  budget  were  distributed  in  accordance  with  the
findings of the Comprehensive Review; this was done with  an  eye
toward  achieving a balance among the five strategic  areas  that
reflects  the priorities of the National Strategy. The  following
charts  show, by strategic area, how the budget distribution  has
evolved   to   fit  the  new  policy  guidance,  with  continuing
refinements in the FY 95 request.

    Conclusion

     In summary, the Department's restructured counterdrug policy
is  well  defined and directly supports the National Drug Control
Strategy.   In  the  last  year  DOD has  significantly  improved
program  management,  and  efforts  to  further  enhance  program
effectiveness  and  increase accountability  are  underway.   The
Administration's  budget request for FY 1995  Defense  Department
counterdrug  activities represents 7% of the Federal  counterdrug
budget.   At  that funding level DOD will be able to continue  to
provide meaningful assistance to overburdened Federal, State, and
local  law  enforcement agencies, and crucial support to  fragile
democracies in Latin America.

     There  can  be  no doubt of the harm illicit drugs  inflict.
While DOD does not have a "silver bullet" that could end the drug
problem quickly, it does have unique talents and assets to  bring
to  the  interagency counterdrug effort. Internationally, DOD  is
engaged  in operations that significantly strengthen the  ability
of  foreign governments, particularly those in the Andean region,
to  arrest  and  prosecute drug traffickers.   Domestically,  the
results  of  DOD  counterdrug programs -  from  providing  excess
equipment  to  State  police, to funding  National  Guard  demand
reduction  programs for at risk youth, to detailing  intelligence
analysts  to Federal agencies to prepare evidence for  successful
criminal  prosecutions - impact communities  around  the  country
every day.


--
--------------------------------------------------------------------
"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
 under conditions of absolute reality"
    -- Shirley Jackson
    The Haunting of Hill House

Chris T. Hugins ([e-mail])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: [phone]   Fax: [phone]

=============================================================================

Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [e-mail] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: Department of State's Response to the Latin American Narcotics Threat
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:23 GMT

[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [e-mail] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:03:59 GMT ]

        Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
       Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
                    June  22, 1994, Wednesday

Section: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony
Headline:   Testimony  June  22, 1994  Robert  Gelbard  Assistant
Secretary   Of   State   Department  Of   State   House   Foreign
Affairs/International Security, International  Organizations  And
Human Rights Anti-Drug Strategy In The Western Hemisphere

    Statement Of Assistant Secretary Of State
    For International Narcotics Matters
    Robert Gelbard
    Before The
    House Foreign Affairs Committee
    June 22, 1994 -

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

     I  appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today  the
Department  of  State's response to the Latin American  narcotics
threat   including  our  1994  International  Narcotics   Control
Strategy   Report  (INCSR)  and  the  President's   certification
decisions that were based on it.  As you have requested,  I  will
also  discuss the President's counternarcotics strategy  for  the
Western  Hemisphere, including efforts to safeguard human rights,
and  our  FY  1995  budget  request.   The  1994  INCSR  is  this
Administration's first full public assessment of the global  drug
threat,  and  the  President's April 1 certification  underscores
this  Administration's response to that threat.  The  message  is
clear.   President  Clinton's  approach  to  international   drug
control  can  be capsulized in five words': no more  business  as
usual.

     Mr.  Chairman,  let  there be no doubts: the  Administration
takes  the problems of drug abuse and trafficking seriously.   We
are  reminded daily by stories from Colombia, Mexico, Russia, and
virtually  every  American community that  the  global  narcotics
trade  is  an insidious threat to America's domestic and  foreign
interests.   It is an increasingly dangerous threat to  democracy
and  sustainable development abroad, undermining the cornerstones
of  our  policies to make America more secure and competitive  in
today's  world.  The effects on American society if  we  fail  to
address   the  narcotics  problem  abroad  will  be  direct   and
unambiguous:  more  addiction,  crime,  violence,  disease,   and
poverty.

    Assessment of the Narcotics Trade: Volatile but Vulnerable

     My  first task after confirmation as the Assistant Secretary
for International Narcotics Matters (INM) in November 1993 was to
take  a  fresh  look  at the dimensions and implications  of  the
foreign narcotics threat.  President Clinton had just issued  his
counternarcotics  directive  instructing  us  to  support   those
countries  that demonstrate the political will and commitment  to
attack  the  drug problem.  He also instructed the Department  of
State  to  apply  stringent  standards  in  the  Congressionally-
mandated certification process, a process that can result in  the
denial  of  assistance to countries that do not  cooperate  fully
with the United States in counternarcotics or take adequate steps
on  their own. I have since traveled to Latin America, Asia,  and
Europe  to  talk with my counterparts, assess their efforts,  and
see our programs at work.

     My  assessment is that the international narcotics trade  is
extremely  volatile and continues to pose a grave danger  to  our
foreign  and  domestic interests.  The major  international  drug
syndicates  continue  to  target  the  U.S.  market  despite  our
intensified  enforcement  efforts  in  recent  years.   They  are
diversifying  into other drugs and criminal activities,  and  are
expanding their operations and markets to regions where political
control  is  weak.  We need greater international cooperation  to
overcome this threat.  There are opportunities for advancing this
objective,  but current levels of cooperation and commitment  are
uneven at best.

     Focusing  on  Latin  America, let me comment  first  on  the
cocaine  situation. We made important gains last year,  but  they
could   be  short-lived  without  stronger  action  by  Colombia,
Bolivia, and  Peru.   The good news: coca leaf production fell by
20  percent,  the  first  decline that  we  have  ever  recorded.
Virtually  all  of  the reduction, however,  occurred  in  Peru's
Huallaga  Valley  as  a consequence of a major  fungus  epidemic,
declining  soil  fertility,  and  counternarcotics  pressure   on
trafficker  operations.  Producers are already moving to  restore
supplies.   Coca cultivation increased in Colombia  and  Bolivia,
and  Peruvian growers are responding to the disease  by  shifting
cultivation to new areas.

     Latin  American governments made important breakthroughs  in
attacking  the  cartels.  Pablo Escobar--the last  of  Colombia's
Medellin kingpins--is dead.  His demise occurred not only because
of  outstanding work by the Colombian security forces,  but  also
because,  in  the  end,  he  had nowhere  to  flee--international
concern  had  made  him a virtual prisoner in  his  own  country.
"Vaticano,"  Peru's  most  notorious  kingpin,  was  arrested  in
Colombia,  expelled  to  Peru,  and  is  now  serving  a  lengthy
sentence.

    Colombia's Cali cartel is meanwhile working hard to implement
a legal and political strategy to thwart prosecutions by U.S. and
Colombian  authorities.  They are seeking  lenient  plea  bargain
arrangements  with  Colombia's independent prosecutor  and,  even
worse,  trying to manipulate ambiguities in the revised Colombian
criminal  procedures that could be used to avoid  punishment  for
serious drug crimes.  We have sent a strong message to Colombia's
President-elect  Ernesto Samper that the crackdown  on  the  Cali
cartel  must  not  falter  if Colombia  wants  to  sustain  close
relations with the United States.

    As pressure mounts on kingpins elsewhere, I predict that they
will  shift  tactics to follow the pattern set by  the  Colombian
cartel.   That is, they will move from simply trying to bribe  or
intimidate  key officials to a more comprehensive strategy  aimed
at permanently crippling the counternarcotics capabilities of the
judicial and enforcement institutions.  There is one sure way  to
thwart this tactic--building stronger democratic counternarcotics
institutions  in key Latin American drug-producing  and  -transit
countries.

     Latin  America also poses an expanding heroin threat to  the
United  States.  There  is  good news in  Mexico  and  Guatemala.
Mexican  production, the traditional threat,  is  being  held  in
check through eradication and related enforcement programs.   The
Government  of  Mexico is accomplishing this on its  own,  having
assumed in 1993 full responsibility for funding and managing  the
$20 million a year narcotics control program the State Department
formerly  administered there. INM's eradication program has  also
virtually  eliminated poppy cultivation in Guatemala.  Colombia's
burgeoning  heroin trade, however, offsets these  accomplishments
and  presents  us  with  one of our most dangerous  drug  control
challenges.  Seeking to diversify operations, Colombia's  cocaine
traffickers  have moved rapidly into opium and heroin production.
The  Government of Colombia, with our help, is responding with  a
crop eradication program, but it still faces an uphill struggle.

     It  is  more  important  than ever  that  we  integrate  our
narcotics  control policies with other foreign policy  objectives
in  Latin  America.  This need comes at a time  of  unprecedented
movement  toward  democracy and economic reform  in  the  region:
military control has given way to civilian rule in country  after
country;  participatory democracy is flourishing;  corruption  is
under  attack;  and  trade, investment, and economic  growth  are
moving forward.

     But all of this is jeopardized if the narcotics trade is not
controlled.  Trafficker  corruption  and  intimidation  can  turn
legislatures,   judiciaries,  police,  the   media,   and   other
democratic institutions into mere facades that provide cover  for
drug operations.  The ability of traffickers to push Colombia  to
the  brink  of  political chaos prior to  its  1990  presidential
elections  and the virtually unobstructed influence they  had  at
the  highest levels of Panama's government before Operation  Just
Cause  underscore the magnitude of this threat.  Such  situations
are not only disastrous for host nations, they make it impossible
for us to pursue important security, trade, commercial, and other
regional and bilateral relations.

     New opportunities for counternarcotics progress are emerging
in  Latin  America.   Thanks to our leadership,  governments  are
increasingly aware of the political, economic, and social  threat
drug  trafficking poses to their societies.  Democratic,  market-
oriented  governments  will be especially responsive.   They  are
more  likely to recognize the adverse effects of the  drug  trade
and  to  have the political will and commitment to respond.   Too
many  governments, however, continue to underestimate  the  risks
and,  consequently, are not taking sufficient steps on their  own
to  address them.  Through a combination of sticks, carrots,  and
new  initiatives, our strategy is designed to encourage and  help
them take these steps.

     Mr.  Chairman, this was the global context on which we based
our  certification recommendations to the President--and on which
he  made  the  final decisions--developed our Western  Hemisphere
strategy,  and  drafted our budget. These actions underscore  the
promise  I made when I accepted this job: there would be no  more
business as usual on international narcotics policy.  I meant it.
In  fact,  I  would not be in this position today if  I  did  not
believe  it.   We  will  be holding countries  that  receive  our
antidrug   assistance   increasingly   accountable   for    their
counternarcotics performance.

    Certification: No More Business as Usual

     One  area where the President's new policy has had a  strong
impact  is  certification.  The Foreign Assistance  Act  requires
that  each  year  the President identify the major drug-producing
and  drug-transit countries and determine whether they have fully
cooperated  with  the United States or taken  adequate  steps  on
their  own-in narcotics control.  The United States must cut  off
most foreign assistance to those countries that are not certified
and  vote  against  their  requests for loans  from  multilateral
development  banks.   For  countries  found  not  to   be   fully
cooperating or taking adequate steps on their own, the  President
may   grant  a  national  interest  certification  if  the  vital
interests  of  the United States require continued  provision  of
foreign assistance.

     On  April  1,  in  accordance with the requirements  of  the
Foreign   Assistance   Act,  the  President   issued   his   1994
certification determination.  This year's certifications are  the
toughest ever.  Ten of 26 countries were either not certified  or
granted  only  a  vital  national interest  certification.   More
countries  than ever have been placed in these categories.   This
is double the number so categorized every year since 1990.  Among
these  are  not  just "pariah" nations, but also  countries  with
which we have strong bilateral interests.

      Three  countries--Nigeria,  Bolivia,  and  Peru--had  never
received  anything  less  than full certification.   Nigeria  was
denied  certification for failing to take satisfactory action  to
curb  blatant corruption and trafficking.  Bolivia and  Peru  did
not  meet  the  requirements for "full"  certification  primarily
because   their   efforts   to  attack  coca   cultivation   were
insufficient,  but  they  were granted  vital  national  interest
certifications.

    Two countries--Panama and Laos--each of which had been denied
certification  before  but  had been fully  certified  in  recent
years,  received vital national interest certifications.   Panama
has  failed  to address squarely its role in international  money
laundering,  the  most  critical drug  control  problem  in  that
country.   Laos has not moved actively to establish  its  special
police  counternarcotics unit, nor did it sustain pressure--after
successive years of decline--to reduce opium poppy cultivation in
1993.

     Of  the  remaining five countries, we gave a vital  national
interest  certification to Lebanon, because it is  in  our  vital
interest  that  Lebanon continue to receive assistance  aimed  at
promoting  economic and political stability, and to  Afghanistan.
To  deny  certification to Afghanistan would  undermine  progress
toward    political    stability   which   is    essential    for
counternarcotics efforts.  We continued to deny certification  to
Burma, Iran, and Syria.

     These  were difficult decisions.  They took into  account  a
number of important U.S. foreign policy interests.  Judging  from
their  public  reactions, some countries were clearly  surprised.
They  apparently  thought that performing at the previous  year's
levels  would  be sufficient.  This is not what the law  requires
and they know it.  Some may have thought they could impress us by
stepping up efforts against less critical targets.  Not  so.   We
will not accept progress by a country against marginal targets as
a  substitute for neglecting the key drug issue.  If a country is
a  money laundering center, we will expect progress against  this
problem;  increased  arrests of low-level couriers  will  not  be
sufficient.

     Countries that were fully certified should not relax.  It is
no  more  in  their  interests  to relax  their  counternarcotics
efforts than it is ours.  Fully certified countries must continue
to  strengthen and improve their drug control programs.  The goal
of  our  "no more business as usual to approach is progress,  not
status  quo.  In making our recommendations to the President,  we
intend to continue strictly applying the statutory standards  for
certification.

     The  fact  that  the President decided  not  to  grant  full
certification to so many countries--several for the first  time--
sends powerful narcotics control messages to foreign and domestic
audiences alike:

     International  narcotics control is  a  key  foreign  policy
concern that the U.S. will put ahead of other bilateral interests
if necessary.

    We will no longer accept weak excuses for inaction; countries
know what we expect.

     We  expect  concrete  results.   After  years  of  supplying
assistance and building institutions, we now expect key countries
to be more responsible for their own antidrug programs.

     We are going to cut waste from global drug control programs.
If  assistance is not being used effectively, it will be  shifted
elsewhere.

     Many  countries where we have important narcotics  bilateral
interests  will  be  electing  new governments  soon;  these  new
governments should realize that narcotics control is at  the  top
of our agenda.

     We do not seek to embarrass governments.  We do not want  to
force them to adopt our standards.  But we want certification  to
be an effective tool for securing greater international narcotics
control and cooperation.  I believe it will be.  In fact, I  have
a  simple  message for the governments of the world, the American
people,  and the Congress: narcotics certification is  an  honest
process.

     We  obviously  would  prefer to  make  substantive  progress
through  cooperative relationships rather than  impose  sanctions
owing  to a lack of cooperation. Nevertheless, this certification
decision  has  given  our  international counternarcotics  policy
greater  credibility.  It is important to sustain this  momentum.
I  have  begun  exploring, in Washington  and  at  posts  abroad,
improved  ways  of  keeping the attention of key  drug  countries
focused on achieving concrete narcotics control goals.  We are in
the  process of making demarches to these countries, highlighting
critical  areas  of performance during the current  certification
cycle.   I  welcome  a dialogue with this Committee  on  how  the
Legislative  and  Executive Branches can make  the  certification
process more effective.

     A  final point concerning certification legislation.  As you
are  aware, if Congress does not act by September 1994, important
provisions  of the International Narcotics Control  Act  of  1992
will expire, eliminating several important improvements that have
helped make certification a more effective counternarcotics tool.
These  improvements, codified in Sections  489  and  490  of  the
Foreign   Assistance  Act,  have  greatly  improved  the   scope,
objectivity,   and   efficiency  of  the   drug   reporting   and
certification processes.  Before the deadline, we would  like  to
see Congress retain these sections with only a few minor language
changes we hope to provide soon to the Committee.

    Improved Strategy: Sharper Focus, Better Tactics

     The  Administration is making new use of  these  instruments
because it has a new international narcotics control strategy and
policy.   Both  were developed to find a better  and  more  cost-
effective  long-term solution to our drug problem and  to  ensure
that  our foreign counternarcotics objectives are integrated with
our   broader  foreign  policy  goals  of  promoting   democracy,
sustainable development, and security around the world.  Allow me
to highlight the key elements of that strategy.

    First, we will support the development of stronger democratic
counternarcotics  institutions in countries  that  demonstrate  a
commitment to narcotics control.  This is critical for convincing
host  governments  to shoulder more of the drug  control  burden.
Strong  and  accountable institutions are the foundation  for  an
effective  policy; they are essential for successful  operations.
The  stronger the institutions, and the more responsive they  are
to  public concerns and respectful of the rule of law,  the  less
likely  they are to succumb to the corrosive influence of  narco-
corruption  and intimidation.  We will put more emphasis  on  the
cocaine source countries where the political and economic  stakes
are   potentially  higher  and  the  trade  is  potentially  more
vulnerable.

     Strengthening  the institutional base starts  with  enacting
good   drug   control  laws  and  then  building  the   judicial,
enforcement, and penal organizations to enforce them.  This  must
include  building respect for the rule of law and  human  rights.
Administration  of  justice programs that serve  both  ourbroader
democracy-building  and our drug control  objectives  will  be  a
major part of this effort.  So too will be training and, in  some
countries,  support to the military, with emphasis in both  cases
on   human  rights.   Other  important  elements  include  public
awareness and demand-reduction programs to alleviate the  adverse
social effects of the drug trade and to build public support  for
antidrug programs.

      Second,  we  will  integrate  our  antidrug  efforts   with
sustainable  development programs, focusing  on  both  macro  and
micro  objectives.   Strengthening the  economies  of  key  drug-
producing and -transit countries creates economic alternatives to
narcotics  production and trafficking and increases the resources
host  nations can devote to narcotics control.  Macro  objectives
are   aimed  at  broad-based  growth  that  expands  income   and
employment  alternatives throughout the economy and include  such
measures  as  balance of payments supports and other programs  to
generate   foreign  trade  and  investment.  micro   objectives--
targeted  in and outside drug-producing areas--are important  for
ensuring  that  small  producers  have  viable  alternatives  for
narcotics   crops.   Such  projects  also  help   to   facilitate
eradication and other enforcement efforts by extending government
authority and presence into drug-producing areas.

     Third,  we  will seek to involve multilateral  and  regional
organizations  in our counternarcotics programs  and  objectives.
Multilateral   organizations  can  complement  our   institution-
building  and sustainable development initiatives, operate  where
our  access  is  limited,  and attract  additional  international
donors  to the antidrug effort.  We will increase support to  our
traditional  UN partner--the United Nations Drug Control  Program
(UNDCP)--and will continue to urge greater involvement  by  other
UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP.  We have recently undertaken
the  first-ever  initiatives  to engage  international  financial
institutions   and   multilateral  development   banks   in   the
counternarcotics  effort.  INM and AID  have  already  held  many
meetings  with  the leadership of the World Bank and  the  Inter-
American  Development  Bank to discuss  how  their  programs  can
contribute to eliminating illicit coca cultivation in Bolivia and
Peru.    We will be coordinating with them more closely to ensure
that   their   programs   complement  our  counternarcotics   and
sustainable development objectives in host nations.

     Our  fourth  objective  is  to achieve  more  effective  law
enforcement   operations   against   the   kingpins   and   their
organizations--a  goal  supported  by  institution-building   and
sustainable  development initiatives which enhance the  political
will  and  ability  of host nations to move  in  this  direction.
Although  we have yet to see appropriately aggressive prosecution
on   significant   kingpins  in  Colombia,   recent   enforcement
operations in Colombia and other countries convince us  that  the
kingpins  and their organizations are now vulnerable to increased
and  enhanced host nation enforcement efforts.  The institutional
building blocks, USG support, and commitment are already in place
to  be  more  aggressive on this front.  We intend  to  encourage
greater regional and international cooperation, tougher action on
chemical  and  money  controls, adoption  and  implementation  of
aggressive   and  comprehensive  asset  forfeiture   legislation,
extraditions,   and   other  measures   to   weaken   the   major
organizations,  and  apprehend,  convict,  and  incarcerate   for
appropriately  severe  terms  of  imprisonment,  their   leaders.
Targeting the leadership of the cartels and their vast ill-gotten
fortunes  disrupts  their  entire organization,  makes  narcotics
trafficking less profitable, and blunts the effects of corruption
and  intimidation,  the  most dangerous drug-related  threats  to
democratic political systems.

     Success  will depend on securing the commitment  of  foreign
governments to set their drug enforcement sights on the kingpins.
It will be achieved through good intelligence and police work and
not  necessarily  through the constant application  of  high-cost
technology as has been the case with interdiction.

    Human Rights

     I am aware of how the human rights issue is connected to the
narcotics  control  assistance we provide to foreign  police  and
military  units. Fortunately, we have rarely found  human  rights
abuses   in   our  counter-narcotics  programs,  but  we   remain
concerned.  As I have already emphasized, a major thrust  of  our
institution-building  initiatives is to  strengthen  respect  for
human   rights.    Accordingly,  we  have   established   several
mechanisms  to  minimize  the potential  for  violations  and  to
identify  them  and  take corrective actions  quickly  when  they
occur.

     In  Colombia,  Peru,  and  Bolivia,  U.S.  Embassies  screen
individuals  for  counternarcotics  training,  target  assistance
specifically  for antidrug units, and monitor ongoing  operations
for  possible  abuses.   We  are in the process  of  establishing
mechanisms  to screen units prior to delivering counternarcotic's
assistance.   Meanwhile,  I work closely  with  the  Department's
Bureau  of  Democracy,  Human Rights, and Labor  to  monitor  and
respond  to  allegations  of human rights  abuses  by  government
forces that may receive funding, training, or other support  from
U.S.  Government counternarcotics programs.  Assistant  Secretary
Shattuck  and I co-chair an interagency working group to  address
these problems and recently agreed to instruct our military group
in Colombia to add more aggressive human rights monitoring to its
end- use-monitoring mission for equipment and assistance provided
to  the  Colombian military.  INM recently discussed our Colombia
initiatives  with  Amnesty  International  representatives.   Our
Embassies  in  Colombia,  Bolivia, and  Peru  have  human  rights
working  groups that mirror our efforts in Washington to identify
and  resolve human rights abuses.  In addition, AID programs that
advance drug control objectives, such as justice system reform in
Colombia  and  Bolivia, also include mechanisms to protect  human
rights.

     The bottom line is that our counternarcotics assistance  can
be  a  powerful force in advancing, rather than retarding,  human
rights  objectives in the hemisphere.  Our training and oversight
help  instill respect for human rights and professionalism  among
police  and  military commanders in the host  countries,  a  fact
underscored  by  the  virtual absence of confirmed  human  rights
violations  by counternarcotics forces.  Moreover, it is  through
the   provision  of  assistance  that  we  can  conduct  end  use
monitoring  and  in  that way keep an eye  on  the  human  rights
performance of these forces.  Indeed, in many ways, the narcotics
kingpins,  whom these commanders and their forces are  trying  to
subdue, pose a far more fundamental threat to human rights.  This
is  evident  in  the  way narco-traffickers have  terrorized  the
press,   corrupted  local  police  forces,  and   paralyzed   the
judiciary.   We  will  remain vigilant,  but  I  believe  that  a
withdrawal of our counternarcotics support could be a setback for
human rights.

    Budget Support

     Mr.  Chairman,  the  President's  counternarcotics  strategy
recognizes  that we must operate within tight budgets.   This  is
why  it  stresses  the need to concentrate resources  and  pursue
operations  more efficiently and effectively than  in  the  past.
INM,  with  its  program focus on institution-building  and  long
experience  in  the  source  countries,  developed  its  FY  1995
counternarcotics  budget  request for  $232  million  with  these
principles in mind.

     Let  me  assure  you that we have used fiscal  restraint  in
planning  our  programs.   Our  FY  95  request  reflects  a  new
consolidated  budget  that  includes  for  the  first  time   the
traditional INM account ($152 million) as well as funds that were
formerly  provided  through counternarcotics economic  (ESF)  and
military  (FMF)  security assistance and  International  Military
Education  and  Training (IMET) accounts.  Of  the  $232  million
total,  approximately  $205 million is  for  Latin  American  and
Caribbean  programs.  The $232 million is less than what  we  had
requested  in  FY  94 and over $100 million  less  than  what  we
received in FY 93.

     The  House  recently voted out an appropriations  bill  that
frankly jeopardizes our programs and policy.  The traditional INM
account  was broken out and cut to $115 million, marginally  more
than last year.  The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out
last  week  an  INM  budget of only $100 million.   Cuts  in  our
overall  request for economic and military assistance are  likely
to  force  us  to reduce further our counternarcotics assistance.
We  are  surviving on our drastically reduced  FY  94  budget  by
drawing  on  the  prior-year  pipeline,  deferring  upgrades  and
improvements, and seeking augmentations from ONDCP and  DoD.   We
have  cut most overseas programs to the core.  A continuation  at
the $115 million level will have serious consequences.

     Scaling back source country programs: INM will be faced with
reducing  its  plans for sustainable development  initiatives  in
Bolivia  and  Peru,  weakening  our  efforts  to  strengthen  the
political  and  economic underpinnings for their counternarcotics
commitment  and performance.  We would curb aviation  support  to
the Andes, causing large cutbacks in police operations.

     Closing programs: we would make deep cuts in transit country
programs, possibly closing some operations completely.   Judicial
enhancement,    intelligence   collection   and   sharing,    and
interdiction operations would suffer.

    Stopping eradication initiatives At $115 million, we will not
be  able  to sustain the recent momentum that has overcome  major
hurdles in winning greater host nation commitment to eradication.
Colombia will not be able to keep pace with poppy production  and
will have to delay its new coca eradication efforts. Setbacks  in
Colombia  will cause recent progress to strengthen the  political
will of the governments of Bolivia and Peru to falter.

     Gutting  aviation  support:. We are  abiding  by  Congress's
wishes  that  we  get  out of the air force  business.   We  have
already reduced our air wing from 62 to 48 aircraft.  The  budget
cuts,  however,  would  force us to make deeper  reductions  than
planned, forcing us to either mothball aircraft or turn them over
to  host countries before they are fully capable of receiving  or
maintaining them.

    Diverting funds from other Priorities: To save what we can of
the  Andean programs, we would have to divert funding from  other
priority  programs such as international heroin control  and  our
new  initiatives to address the organized crime threats from  the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere.

     I do not mean to sound alarmist, but I do mean to inform the
Committee   that  a  $115  million  budget  will  have  practical
consequences for U.S. international counternarcotics efforts.

    Conclusion

    Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend that there is an easy solution
to the global narcotics problem.  I am here to say, however, that
the  stakes  in terms of America's security and welfare  are  too
high  for  us  to  abandon"or disengage  from  the  international
narcotics   control  effort.   The  President  has  altered   our
approach.   The increasingly dangerous nature of the threat,  new
opportunities, and current funding realities require it. our  new
approach  does  more than sustain pressure;  it  attacks  at  the
criminal,  economic, and political heart of the trade and  raises
the stakes against those who oppose or obstruct our efforts.   We
have  built  this strategy on lessons learned.   We  have  enough
evidence to know that it can work if given time and support,  and
that the consequences are dire if it is allowed to fail.

     I  look forward to working closely with the Members of  this
Committee  on  our  counternarcotics  objectives  and  seek  your
support  in  ensuring that we have adequate funds to  meet  these
objectives.   We  must  avoid making cuts that  will  starve  the
President's  strategy to death in its first year  and  leave  the
United  States  without  a  coherent,  supportable  international
narcotics control strategy.

--
--------------------------------------------------------------------
"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
 under conditions of absolute reality"
    -- Shirley Jackson
    The Haunting of Hill House

Chris T. Hugins ([e-mail])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: [phone]   Fax: [phone]

=============================================================================

Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs
From: [e-mail] (Chris Hugins)
Subject: Programs of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the Americas
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:51 GMT

[ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ]
[ Author was [e-mail] ]
[ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:07:09 GMT ]

       Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.
      Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
                      June  22, 1994, Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
HEADLINE:    TESTIMONY   JUNE   22,   1994   THOMAS   CONSTANTINE
ADMINISTRATOR  DRUG  ENFORCEMENT  ADMINISTRATION  HOUSE   FOREIGN
AFFAIRS/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

    Statement of
    Thomas A. Constantine
    Administrator
    The Drug Enforcement Administration
    United States Department of Justice
    for
    House Foreign Affairs Committee
    U.S. House of Representatives
    Concerning
    International Narcotic Control Programs
    June 22, 1994

    Chairmen Torricelli and Lantos, Members of the Subcommittees:
Thank  you  for  the opportunity to appear before  you  today  to
discuss the programs of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
in this hemisphere.  I appreciate this chance to speak about some
of   the  important  challenges  we  face  in  our  international
programs.

     I  have been the Administrator of DEA for three months  now,
and  in that short time I have recognized the need for us to  put
the  international programs into a better perspective in relation
to  our  overall  domestic drug enforcement effort.  I  think  we
frequently lose sight of how our international programs  go  hand
in  hand with what we are doing within our borders, and today I'd
like  to  talk  about some important cases and DEA efforts  which
link  the international and domestic aspects of our drug  control
mission.

    Violent crime has changed the face of America during the past
decade.   You  cannot  turn on the evening news  without  hearing
reports  of  gun  violence  or vicious  crimes  against  innocent
children.   Neighborhoods are no longer safe; even where  I  come
from  in upstate New York, many people will not leave their homes
after dark, or walk down the street to buy a loaf of bread.   The
links  between  drugs and violent crime is sometimes  overlooked,
but  it  is  real and still a central issue for us to deal  with.
Before  1985,  violent  crime  was actually  decreasing  after  a
significant  increase  during the  sixties  and  seventies.   The
appearance  of  crack  cocaine in 1985 dramatically  changed  the
landscape  of  crime  and  the criminal  justice  system  in  our
country.  This drug, as you know, spawned violence and addiction,
tragedies we are living with every day.

     My  assessment is that our current violent crime  wave  will
remain with us for the foreseeable future.  Demographics for  the
coming  decades  indicate that by the year 2005,  the  number  of
young  people  aged 15-19 will increase by 25  percent.   Because
young  men aged 1824 are twice as likely to commit crimes as  men
over  25,  we could continue to see significant rates of  violent
crime  well  into the next century.  We must break the  cycle  of
drug  trafficking and drug abuse if we are to survive this  crime
wave.

     I  think  we  can do that, but it will require  us  ---  the
American  people  and  our  government  ---  to  establish  sound
policies  and  to stick with them for the long haul.   This  will
require  both domestic and international efforts which are  built
upon programs that work and have shown results.

     For  many  years,  DEA  has been at the  forefront  of  this
nation's  efforts  to  dismantle international  drug  trafficking
organizations.    We   will  continue  to   aggressively   pursue
traffickers  who  operate around the globe.  As Administrator,  I
intend  to  continue DEA's important global mission, keeping  the
following principles as guiding our actions in the coming years:

     First,  that we must recognize that cocaine and heroin  have
foreign  sources and the world's major trafficking  organizations
are  headquartered  in  foreign countries.   Other  nations  have
international   obligations  to  address  the  issues   of   drug
production and trafficking.  DEA will continue to work  with  the
authorities  in  other  nations  to  build  institutions,   share
intelligence  and  make  cases  which  have  an  impact  on  drug
trafficking  in the United States. Concurrently, we will  enhance
our  domestic  efforts,  as  well,  balancing  both  foreign  and
domestic  programs.   That however, does not  mean  that  we  are
lessening  our  pressure  on the ma or traffickers  in  Colombia,
Bolivia  and   Peru,  but  rather,  that  we  will  increase  our
attention on the surrogates that operate within our borders.

     Second,  that resources for international programs  must  be
dedicated  intelligently  and  strategically,  allowing  DEA  the
flexibility  to  act  quickly as new  threats  and  opportunities
arise.

     Third, that we have an obligation to the American people  to
enhance the quality of life in our communities across the nation.
DEA has a major role to play in removing violent traffickers, who
have a direct link to the degradation of life in our communities,
from  neighborhoods, and reducing the amount of drugs  trafficked
in our cities and towns.

      Fourth,  that  heroin  is  a  major  concern  to  us,   and
international and domestic programs must be developed to  address
this problem before it becomes any more serious.

      I  intend  to  use  these  principles  to  formulate  DEA's
contribution  to  the  international  strategy,  articulated   in
Presidential Decision Directive 14, which was signed by President
Clinton  last November.  This Directive states that  "the  United
States  will  treat  as a serious national  security  threat  the
operations of international criminal syndicates" and will  assist
those nations demonstrating the political will necessary to fight
narcotics trafficking.  I'd like to take a few minutes to discuss
with you some developments which have led to these assumptions.

    Major Traffickers and their Surrogates: Despite the fact that
an  increasing  percentage of cocaine is  being  shipped  to  new
European  markets, the U.S. continues to be the main  target  for
shipments  from the Colombian cocaine cartels.  The  Cali  cartel
maintains  a  lock  on  much  of the U.S.  cocaine  supply.  This
organization,  headquartered  in  Colombia,  depends  on  cocaine
producers  and  transporters  in  Bolivia,  Peru,  Mexico,  other
Central American nations, and the United States.  It also  staffs
distribution  organizations in the major  cities  of  the  United
States  with Colombians who subcontract with street organizations
in  these cities.  DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing  the
cocaine  supply  in  the U.S. : targeting the cartel  leaders  in
Colombia  and  eliminating their surrogates'  operations  in  the
United States.

     It  is  critical to gather enough information on  the  major
cartel  leaders for indictments in the event that  they  will  be
brought  to  justice  in the U.S. That, however,  is  less  of  a
possibility  today than it was prior to Colombian  constitutional
prohibition  on the extradition of nationals.  Nevertheless,  DEA
continues  to  put  pressure on the cartels by  interfering  with
their  money supplies, transportation networks, chemical supplies
and  communications --- all the means that are critical to  their
operations.  During the past year, DEA, working with  other  U.S.
agencies  and  with counterparts in Andean and  Central  American
nations, made significant inroads into the cocaine trade in  this
hemisphere.  Some of these include:

     Medellin cartel leaders were either jailed or killed.  Pablo
Escobar  and Juan Camilo ZAPATA-Vasquez were killed in  shootouts
with the Colombian National Police. Fabio OCHOA was sentenced  to
an eight year prison term.

    A major Peruvian trafficker, Demetrio CHAVEZ-Penaherrera (aka
VATICANO) was arrested in Cali and expelled to Peru where  he  is
now serving a thirty year prison sentence.

     Julio Fabio URDINOLA-Grajales, the brother of Ivan Urdinola,
one   of  Colombia's  major  money  launderers,  surrendered   to
Colombian authorities in March.

    On September 2, 1993, Jaime Garcia-Garcia, whose organization
provided  major  transportation services for a  number  of  major
Colombian traffickers, was arrested by Colombian authorities;  he
is presently incarcerated. Prior to his arrest, in June 1993, one
of  Garcia's former associates Joaquin Guzman-Loera, was arrested
in Guatemala on the El Salvador border.

     Seizures included major loads in Guatemala (6.6 MT),  Mexico
(33.1 MD, OPBAT (2.2 MT) and Peru (8,900 kg).

     Several  other former leaders of the Medellin cartel  remain
incarcerated.

     Of equal importance to DEA are accomplishments which have  a
direct effect on U.S. cocaine supplies and operations within  our
borders.    Most  cases  have  both  international  and  domestic
elements,  and  many could not have been undertaken  successfully
without the involvement of our overseas offices.  A few examples:

     A  New York-based Dominican Ramon Valasquez was transporting
Colombian  cocaine  through Mexico into New York.   An  informant
arranged to transport 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Mexico thru
Texas  into  New  York.   The  cocaine  was  delivered  back   to
Colombians  in  New York, where it was seized.  Valasquez  worked
with Mexican transporters, Colombians in New York and Mexicans in
Texas.

     A  Colombian cocaine trafficker/money launderer who imported
cocaine  from  Colombia  to  Mexico  to  New  Jersey,  used   car
dealerships  in  both  Los  Angeles  and  Phoenix,   Arizona   to
facilitate distribution.  In June 1992, 800 kilograms of  cocaine
transported  in  a  R.V. was seized in Phoenix,  Arizona,  and  8
individuals were arrested. The Colombian trafficker is  currently
a fugitive.

     DEA/Tucson targeted a Mexican transportation group based  in
Agua  Prieta  Sonora,  Mexico.  This group transported  Colombian
cocaine and Mexican marijuana. A six-month wiretap investigation,
which  monitored  19  telephones  and  intercepted  radio  mobile
telephone  communications, resulted  in  the  indictment  of  108
defendants  in  the U.S.  and Mexico, as well as the  seizure  of
4,000  pounds  of marijuana, 200 kilograms of cocaine,  and  $3.5
million in assets.

     DEA/Houston  targeted  Colombians and Mexicans  transporting
Colombian  cocaine  into  Houston.   The  organization   utilized
"trapped"  vehicles, which were loaded with cocaine  in  Colombia
and driven through Guatemala and Mexico and into Texas. The money
was  smuggled back to Colombia in the same fashion.  The  cocaine
smuggled  into  Houston  was further  distributed  in  New  York,
Chicago and Louisiana.

     In  November, 1993, as a result of a lookout placed  by  the
Santiago, Chile Country Office, the Newark Field Division of  DEA
seized  606  kilograms  of cocaine from containers  shipped  from
Chile.

     Through  wire  intercepts, pen registers  and  surveillance,
earlier  this  month  (June 1-2), DEA  seized  150  kilograms  of
cocaine,  $600,000 and numerous documents connected to a  cocaine
trafficking organization related to Ivan Urdinola and other major
traffickers  in  Miami,  New York and Houston.   32  people  were
arrested,  including a cell manager for the Houston area.   Prior
enforcement action taken in this investigation in Miami, Houston,
and  New York resulted in the arrest of over 18 suspects, and the
seizure  of 5 pounds of Colombian heroin, nearly 1,470  kilograms
of cocaine, and over $15 million.

     DEA depends heavily on the use of court-ordered wiretaps  to
intercept  conversations in pursuit of making cases  against  the
cartel   members.   These  Title  3's  are  costly  and  manpower
intensive since most of the conversations are in Spanish and must
be  translated  into English.  Last year, Title  3's  agency-wide
cost  over $14 million; this year's cost is projected to be about
$17 million.

      A   major  Nigerian  heroin  trafficking  organization  was
documented  in  August 1993 with the arrest of two  Nigerians  in
Bangkok,  Thailand.  Extradition proceedings are pending  against
each of these individuals, who face heroin importation charges in
New  Jersey.  This investigation also developed intelligence that
led  to  indictments  in  the Northern  District  of  California,
District of Florida, and District of Minnesota for separate multi-
kilogram   importations  of  heroin  into  the   United   States.
Additional  intelligence and evidence to support prosecutions  of
American-  based members of this organization in the Eastern  and
Northern   District  of  New  York  was  also   developed.    The
investigation   confirmed   that   this   Nigerian    trafficking
organization  operated  in Southeast Asia,  utilized  New  Jersey
based  West Africans, and imported multiple kilograms  of  heroin
annually  into  the  United  States.  The  organization  utilized
international  monetary transfers to facilitate this  importation
and  to disburse the proceeds.  In addition, the organization was
also    responsible   for   supplying   secondary    distribution
organizations  operating in the Northeast,  Middle  Atlantic  and
Midwest areas of the United States.

      The   intemational-domestic  links  between  major  cocaine
organizations  and  the street-level drug  trade  in  the  United
States  are well illustrated by a case I'm familiar with from  my
days as Superintendent of the New York State Police.  The Herrera
family,  with direction from Cali, Colombia, operated a  cell  in
New  York City.  The cell head was Helmer Herrera, brother of the
cartel  head.  (The  Herrera organization's annual  profits  were
three  times those of DEA's yearly budget.) All decisions carried
out  in  the  United States were made in Colombia  --which  phone
numbers  to  use,  which  loads to move,  what  to  pay  workers.
Detailed  records  on  salaries, family history  of  workers  and
consignments  of cocaine were kept.  This was the  cocaine  which
ended  up in the suburbs of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut,
the  cocaine  which was ultimately distributed by violent  street
gangs.   DEA, working with the New York State Police,  dismantled
this  cell  and  seized records, computer disks  and  money.  100
arrests were made, 22 of which were principal defendants.   After
a  disruption of several months, another cell resumed  operations
and  there was no ultimate reduction in cocaine supplies  in  New
York.

     What  this  case proves is the fact that both  ends  of  the
cocaine  trade must be vigorously pursued.  Players on both  ends
are  replaceable, and the pressure must be kept up at  the  high,
middle and low ends of the trade.  While Pacho Herrera heads  the
arm  of  the  cocaine  organization doing  part  of  the  cocaine
business  in  New York City, it is the violent street  gangs  who
shoot  children  in  the  public housing  complex  in  Washington
Heights.  It's critical to get them off the street too.

     We are at an important junction in our drug strategy.  At  a
time  when  resources for law enforcement and foreign  assistance
programs are tight, we are having to balance the need to  protect
Americans  from  crime  in  our streets  with  our  international
obligations to our overseas partners in the drug fight.   As  the
Administrator  of  DEA,  I am reviewing  both  our  domestic  and
international programs to determine how we can make better use of
our  resources.  I expect that with the advice and input of DEA's
senior   management,  we  will  be  streamlining  some   of   our
international  efforts  in  order to  ensure  that  our  programs
contribute  to the overall drug strategy which has both  domestic
and international components.

     The  Need  to  Balance International and Domestic  Programs:
Building  on  the  premise  that we  must  balance  our  domestic
enforcement programs and our international efforts, I would  like
to  discuss  some  of  the  obstacles  we  must  overcome  to  be
successful  in our international programs.  The reality  is  that
major traffickers have intimidated or subomed various police  and
government officials, enabling them to continue operating.  There
are  limits on what the United States can expect foreign  nations
to  do,  given the fact that many of these nations do not control
large areas where drug production and trafficking take place.  We
have  more  leverage in some places than in others; in a  country
like  Burma,  the source of most of the world's  opium,  we  have
almost  none.   We  cannot  influence  Colombia's  Constitutional
Court,  which  recently held that possession  and  use  of  small
amounts  of  certain  drugs  are  constitutionally  protected  in
Colombia,  nor can we control government officials  who  advocate
more liberal drug policies in Colombia.  We can, and do, use  the
Presidential  certification process to  send  strong  signals  to
other  nations to comply with their international obligations  to
reduce  drug production and trafficking, and in some  cases,  the
message is heard loud and clear.  The President's decision not to
certify Nigeria has certainly gotten that government's attention.

     International  programs are an important  component  of  our
overall  strategy  which  must be viewed  through  the  prism  of
reality.   We must not abandon or significantly scale back  these
programs.   But, we cannot expect them to solve our drug  problem
or eliminate drug trafficking and abuse from our nation.

     DEA will absolutely continue to support institution building
in  other  nations  as  we  implement the President's  directive.
Working with the Colombian National Police, we have been able  to
help  them enhance their law enforcement operations aimed against
production and transportation networks in more remote regions  of
Colombia.   We  have  also  been able to  increase  the  Bolivian
Government's    capabilities   in   managing,    assessing    and
disseminating  drug  intelligence  information.   DEA  has   been
instrumental   in  improving  the  ability  of  law   enforcement
organizations in Mexico, El Salvador and Argentina, to cite  some
examples.   Regarding  DEA programs, such  as  Snowcap,  we  will
ensure that the role of DEA is to train and provide liaison  with
host-country   enforcement  organizations.   As  host   countries
gradually  become  more sophisticated and capable  in  their  law
enforcement  programs, there will be less of a need  for  DEA  to
play a direct operational role.  During 1993, 2,383 officers from
45  countries  have  been  trained in  basic  and  advanced  drug
enforcement  by  DEA.   Of  particular  note  is  our  work  with
officials from the Newly Independent States whose nations are now
confronting a serious drug problem.  Later this month, I will  be
traveling  with  FBI  Director Freeh and  (State)  INM  Assistant
Secretary  Robert Gelbard to Russia and several Eastern  European
countries to assess their needs as these countries address  crime
and drugs.

     I  have  asked DEA's top management to take a  look  at  our
international programs, including Operation Snowcap,  and  report
back to me on whether these programs should continue as currently
structured.   I  believe that our commitments to  some  of  these
programs  should  not  be limitless, given  budget  and  staffing
realities.  DEA will continue to participate as a full partner in
our  international programs, but we need to be more conscious  of
costs and results than we have in the past.

      Heroin:   I   am  deeply  concerned  about  the   increased
availability and dramatically increased purity in heroin  in  the
United  States.   Worldwide production of opium rose  from  2,580
metric  tons in 1988 to 3,699 metric tons in 1993.  Most of  this
production  occurred in Afghanistan and Burma, where the  central
government  does  not  control the growing areas.   In  addition,
analysis of data from DEA's Domestic Monitor Program shows street-
level  purity  continuing to rise.  Heroin purity in  the  United
States  has  increased from 3.6 percent in 1980 to 37 percent  in
1992.   With  the  increase  in heroin  availability  and  purity
levels,  we  have  also seen a continued rise in  the  number  of
heroin-related emergency room drug abuse episodes, especially  in
Seattle, Newark and San Francisco.

     Of  special concern is the fact that traffickers in Colombia
are   cultivating  opium  and  producing  heroin.   Despite   the
Colombian government's herbicidal eradication program, there  are
about  20,000  hectares  of opium under cultivation.  This  makes
Colombia  the world's third largest source of opium poppy.   From
an enforcement standpoint, we are also concerned because Colombia
has  in  place  sophisticated trafficking  networks  which  could
readily diversify into heroin trafficking.

      During   the   coming  months,  DEA,   as   part   of   the
Administration's  review of heroin programs, will  be  developing
heroin  strategies  to  address the myriad  heroin  threats  from
Southeast  Asia,  Southwest Asia, Nigerian  traffickers  and  the
Colombian organizations now producing and trafficking heroin.  We
must  vigorously confront this threat by focusing the operational
resources  of all international intelligence and law  enforcement
agencies on attacking the infrastructure and leadership of  these
trafficking  organizations.   We must  identify  and  attack  the
weaknesses  in  these organizations and disrupt  their  financial
operations,  as  well  as arrest, prosecute  and  imprison  those
responsible.    This  will  take  a  concerted  effort   by   the
international  community to address this renewed threat  from  an
old enemy.

     Flexibility to meet new opportunities and threats: DEA  must
remain flexible and innovative in addressing the challenges posed
by  international drug traffickers.  In order to respond fully to
both  the domestic and international aspects of the drug problem,
we  must  have  the necessary resources required to address  this
national threat.  These international drug organizations are well-
financed,  with  connections throughout  the  United  States  and
abroad.  Therefore, DEA must be in a position to move quickly  to
address  emerging  threats after having identified  opportunities
for meaningful actions.

     In  closing,  I  again want to thank the Chairmen  for  this
opportunity  to  discuss DEA's international  programs  with  you
today.  I know that the coming months hold much challenge for  me
personally and for DEA as an agency.  I will be happy  to  answer
any questions you, or others on the Committee may have.


--
--------------------------------------------------------------------
"No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely
 under conditions of absolute reality"
    -- Shirley Jackson
    The Haunting of Hill House

Chris T. Hugins ([e-mail])
OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8
19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014
Phone: [phone]   Fax: [phone]